Japan Nuclear Crisis: US Embassies, Military Shredded Dox For 4 Days

oddharmonic's Squeaky vs. The Bag Of Shredded Paper via Flickr (thanks)


Recently from Japan Times, via Energy News:



Japan Times, Jeff Kingston of Temple University Japan, Apr. 4, 2014: Kyle Cleveland, my colleague [...] recently published a report in the online Asia-Pacific Journal […] Cleveland has pieced together a critical, but nuanced picture of a crisis that was closer to careening out of control than is generally acknowledged.  […] Cleveland elucidates the yawning chasm between the minimizing and downplaying efforts of [Tepco] and the U.S. government’s assessments […] Naval officers […] discovered the level of radiation was far worse than they anticipated. Radiation gauges on the [U.S.S. Ronald Reagan] measured levels of radiation at 100 nautical miles off the coast that were 30 times greater than normal. [Sailors] claim that they have had significant health problems due to exposure to radiation […] Cleveland finds that there was considerable disagreement between various U.S. agencies about the severity of the risk […] Given that the U.S. government expanded the exclusionary zone in Fukushima to 80 km and developed contingency plans for a massive evacuation while shredding of documents continued for four days at the U.S. Embassy and military bases in Japan, somebody was obviously very worried. […] Some of his insider sources tell him that the crisis was actually far worse than anyone acknowledged at the time and that information was withheld to prevent a panic. Cleveland concludes that Japan’s nuclear reactors should not be restarted.
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Making source documents more conveniently available being a fetish of mine, here you have the sources.

All documents except the zip file open in the viewport.  Comment if there is any difficulty.

Mobilizing Nuclear Bias: 
The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Politics of Uncertainty                

核に纏わる疑念を動員 
福島原発危機と不核に纏わる疑念を動員 
福島原発危機と不 
確実性の政治学確実性の政治学

by
Kyle Cleveland




Abstract


The nuclear disaster in Fukushima which followed in the wake of the 3/11 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami has given rise to one of the most significant public health crises in modern world history, with profound implications for how nuclear energy is perceived. This paper analyzes the most dire phase of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, showing how the level of risk was assessed by nuclear experts and state-level actors who worked largely out of view of public scrutiny. In addition to examining how the accident progression in the reactors was addressed and conveyed to the general public, the paper addresses how the exclusionary zones were determined by Japanese and foreign governments in Japan. As the crisis unfolded and efforts to bring the reactors under control were initially proving ineffective, concerns increased that radiation dispersion was unmitigated, and with radiation monitoring by the U.S. military indicating levels significantly beyond TEPCO’s conservative assessments, the United States broke with Japan, recommending an 80km exclusionary zone, and initiating military assisted departures for embassy staff and Department of Defense dependents from Japan. These actions deviated significantly from Japan’s assessments (which had established a 30km evacuation zone), creating a dynamic where the U.S. provided technical consultation for the nuclear response while striving to maintain a delicate diplomatic balance as they attempted to impose a qualitatively different crisis management response. Because this crisis had significant implications for Japan's international relations, diplomatic considerations have helped to suppress the complex, often fractious relations between Japan and foreign governments - especially the United States - whose collective efforts eventually turned the tide from managing the nuclear meltdowns to ameliorating their long-term consequences. Based on interviews with political officials in both the Japanese government and foreign embassies in Japan, and nuclear experts and military officers who worked the crisis, the paper analyzes how technical assessments drove decision making and were translated into political policy.





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