Showing posts with label fukushima. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fukushima. Show all posts

U.S. Nuclear Incident Emergency Planning,
Revised At Last,
Just Got Worse






"They're saying, 'If there's no way to evacuate, then we won't,'" Phillip Musegaas, a lawyer with the environmental group Riverkeeper, said of the stronger emphasis on taking shelter at home."

          

The Three Mile Island disaster frightened everyone almost to their senses in 1979 (do you remember the evening news?  If not, check it out here). The US emergency planning program was initiated soon after.  Changes that went into effect last December (2011) were the first since TMI.

Nuclear watchdogs were taken by surprise.  

Some did not know changes were already in effect.

They learned about it same as you, Gentle Reader: from the news.  In this case, your source is yours truly, summarizing & concatenating, adding primary sourcelink (regulations.gov), and wondering how to harness the incredible energy that comes with righteous indignation.

George Carlin comes to mind, repeating enough times that maybe we would get it: "They don't care about you."  I miss him.


Nuclear accident planning in 1980 saw risks mitigated by a sparsely populated plant location; since then the amount of people living within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant is up 450 per cent.  

In fact, the distance from what could be another nuclear disaster -- one that could easily dwarf Fukushima (see here, and here, for starters) -- is 50 miles or less for two out of five Americans (AP Census, 2010).

Weaknesses in the program were uncovered, investigated, and publicized, according to AP, by AP.  They include:

• many reactors now operating beyond their design life  
• rules relaxed to accomodate  "deteriorating safety margins;" 
• emergency exercises inadequate in size or scope
         • not testing community, only leadership response
         • not practicing traffic re-routing and expediting 
         • not planning or testing evacuation strategies

The nuclear power industry and FEMA are both described as advocating the new changes because..... having to be flexible "will help keep responders on their toes."

I am not making this up.

There is one new drill. Guess what it is.  Guess.  I'll wait.

A preparedness that we could not afford not to exercise. 

 Go ahead, guess.

...a drill to prepare for a terrorist incident at the local nuclear plant.

Uh-Huh.

It gets better.  The most questioned new requirement?  As in, the one the government employees themselves have raised objections to? 

That now and again it is assumed little or no harmful radiation will have been released

And to top the sickening mess all off: What was the new requirement that should have have been the most questioned?  

Warning: may raise your blood pressure, or sicken you, or whiten your hair....

Evacuations have been severely cut back.  Planning, practice, preparedness.  In a word, capability.  

THERE IS NO LONGER ANY PLAN TO EVACUATE THE POPULATION 
FARTHER OUT THAN A TWO MILE RADIUS 
FROM A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.

Even for a severe accident.  

Sure, some allowance is made for plumes, but that's it.
  
Incredible.  After everything, after 3-11. 

I am left speechless.

"Under the previous standard, people within two miles would be immediately evacuated, along with everyone five miles downwind.  Now, in a large quick release of radioactivity, emergency personnel would concentrate first on evacuating people only within two miles.  Others would be told to stay put and wait for a possible evacuation order later.

 Federal officials say people could risk worse exposure in an evacuation impeded by overcrowded roadways or bad weather."


What does this mean?  

Think about what this new regulation really means.  Think about it hard.  Your life may depend on it.


Like I said, Carlin may be of help -- helps to respond in a healthy way. (H/t to Shoq for the transcript -- it is beneficial to read it first, so here you go):

But there’s a reason. There’s a reason. There’s a reason for this, there’s a reason education SUCKS, and it’s the same reason it will never, ever,  EVER be fixed.
It’s never going to get any better, don’t look for it, be happy with what you’ve got.
Because the owners, the owners of this country don't want that. I'm talking about the real owners now, the BIG owners! The Wealthy… the REAL owners! The big wealthy business interests that control things and make all the important decisions.
Forget the politicians. They are irrelevant. The politicians are put there to give you the idea that you have freedom of choice. You don't. You have no choice! You have OWNERS! They OWN YOU. They own everything. They own all the important land. They own and control the corporations. They’ve long since bought, and paid for the Senate, the Congress, the state houses, the city halls, they got the judges in their back pockets and they own all the big media companies, so they control just about all of the news and information you get to hear. They got you by the balls.
They spend billions of dollars every year lobbying,  lobbying, to get what they want.  Well, we know what they want. They want more for themselves and less for everybody else, but I'll tell you what they don’t want: 
They don’t want a population of citizens capable of critical thinking. They don’t want well informed, well educated people capable of critical thinking. They’re not interested in that. That doesn’t help them. Thats against their interests.
Thats right. They don’t want people who are smart enough to sit around a kitchen table and think about how badly they’re getting fucked by a system that threw them overboard 30 fucking years ago. They don’t want that!
You know what they want? They want obedient workers. Obedient workers, people who are just smart enough to run the machines and do the paperwork. And just dumb enough to passively accept all these increasingly shitty jobs with the lower pay, the longer hours, the reduced benefits, the end of overtime and vanishing pension that disappears the minute you go to collect it, and now they’re coming for your Social Security money. They want your retirement money. They want it back so they can give it to their criminal friends on Wall Street, and you know something? They’ll get it. They’ll get it all from you sooner or later cause they own this fucking place! Its a big club, and you ain’t in it!  You, and I, are not in the big club.
By the way, its the same big club they use to beat you over the head with all day long when they tell you what to believe. All day long beating you over the head with their media telling you what to believe, what to think and what to buy. The table has tilted folks. The game is rigged and nobody seems to notice. Nobody seems to care! Good honest hard-working people; white collar, blue collar it doesn’t matter what color shirt you have on. Good honest hard-working people continue, these are people of modest means, continue to elect these rich cock suckers who don’t give a fuck about you….
they don’t give a fuck about you… 
they don’t give a FUCK about you.
They don’t care about you at all… 
at all… 
AT ALL.  
And nobody seems to notice. Nobody seems to care. Thats what the owners count on. The fact that Americans will probably remain willfully ignorant of the big red, white and blue dick thats being jammed up their assholes everyday, because the owners of this country know the truth.
Its called the American Dream,because you have to be asleep to believe it.


Read more



So.  There you have it.


 Jeff Donn's excellent articles are here, and here.
Here's the original document (& here's an alternate link).



[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 23, 2011)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 72560-72600] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-29735]



[[Page 72559]]

Vol. 76

Wednesday,

No. 226

November 23, 2011

Part III





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52





Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 226 / Wednesday, November 23, 2011 /  Rules and Regulations

[[Page 72560]]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52

[NRC-2008-0122] RIN 3150-AI10


Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)  is amending certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in its  regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and  utilization facilities. The final rule adds a conforming provision in  the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for  new nuclear power plants. The final rule codifies certain voluntary  protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency  Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' and  generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed  by Commission orders. In addition, the final rule amends other licensee  emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive review of the  NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The requirements enhance the ability  of licensees in preparing to take and taking certain EP and protective  measures in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part,  security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11,  2001; clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan  implementation among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to  be more effective and efficient.

DATES: This final rule is effective on December 23, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this  document using the following methods:      NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine  and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's  PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,  Maryland 20852.      NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System  (ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC  are available online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS,  which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If  you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing  the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff  at 1-(800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by email to  pdr.resource@nrc.gov.      Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and  supporting materials related to this final rule can be found at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122. Address  questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: (301) 492- 3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear  Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC  20555-0001; telephone: (301) 415-3874, email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov; or  Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone:  (301) 415-2966, email: Don.Tailleart@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background II. Discussion III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule IV. Section-by-Section Analysis V. Implementation VI. Guidance VII. Criminal Penalties VIII. Agreement State Compatibility IX. Availability of Documents X. Voluntary Consensus Standards XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification XV. Backfit Analysis XVI. Congressional Review Act

I. Background

    After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC  determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP  programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued  adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications  were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim  Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026),  dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license  holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the U.S. This  order required licensees to implement interim compensatory measures  (ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and take  actions such as:     (1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility  between the plans;     (2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response  facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations  facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting  emergency response;     (3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification  (including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees),  activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response  organizations (OROs);     (4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties  are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency  response; and     (5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to  provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.     Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted  inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear  power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and  the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.     Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC  evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the  changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear  Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis Adequacy in the  Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22, 2003 (not  publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission that the  EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing issues.  However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events differ from  accident events due to the planned action to maximize damage and loss  of life and that the EP response to such events also differed. The NRC  staff noted several EP issues that required further action to better  respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.     On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP  program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the  Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP  regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the  Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B,  ``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m.,  Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White  Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated  December

[[Page 72561]]

20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a schedule of  activities for the completion of the comprehensive review. The NRC  staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of Emergency  Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/11  Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available),  requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for  enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11,  2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005  (not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide  the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance.  The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to  proceed with enhancements to address EP issues as described in SECY-05- 0010. As a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02),  ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based  Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that  licensees could integrate into EP programs at power reactors. Bulletin  BL-05-02 also sought to obtain information from licensees on their  actions taken to implement Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP  programs to adjust to the current threat environment. Based on the  results of the post-BL-05-02 inspections, meetings with members of the  nuclear power industry, and licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC  determined that licensees were implementing strategies to satisfy Order  EA-02-026 and enhance their programs to address the changed threat  environment.     As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff  conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure,  including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of  this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders  through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the  elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and  guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public  and other stakeholder meetings.     On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its  review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of  Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20,  2006. In that paper, the NRC staff discussed the activities it had  conducted to complete the review and provided its recommendation to  pursue rulemaking for enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff  explained that the comprehensive review of the EP program identified  several areas where the implementation of EP regulations and guidance,  recent technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events,  drills, and exercises had revealed to the NRC areas for potential  improvement and increased clarity for the EP program. The staff divided  the potential enhancements into two categories: security-based EP  issues and other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and  assigned it a priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of  the issue's relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC  strategic goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.     The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and  analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority,  including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In  SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential  enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these  issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and  resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that  the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient  means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an  opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.     In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission  approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and  guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007,  the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission. During the  development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed the issues identified  in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of conducting rulemaking  and updating guidance on all issues. The staff determined that the best  course of action was to conduct rulemaking on the 12 issues identified  in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and to reassess the  remaining issues at a later date. The decision to conduct rulemaking on  the highest priority issues was made to allow a timelier rulemaking  effort to occur and enable the staff to more completely assess the  remaining lower priority issues.     Due to the similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking  plan as ``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,''  these issues have been partially combined in this final rule.  Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in SRM-M060502,  ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency Planning  Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006,  Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville,  Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006, to  coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop  emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills  and exercises will be challenging and will not precondition participant  responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue  regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it  was so closely related. Bulletin BL-05-02 provided a definition of  ``hostile action'' for use in EP programs: ``An act toward an NPP  [nuclear power plant] or its personnel that includes the use of violent  force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the  licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water  using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to  deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent  may be included.''     In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that would be transparent and  open to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through  various means during the development of this rule. The NRC discussed  the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance at several  conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007 NRC  Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) and the 2008 National  Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference. These meetings  are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.     The NRC posted draft rule language on the Federal rulemaking Web  site, http://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited  stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the  draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule. The  NRC continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open  communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March  5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC  staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking  on enhancements to EP regulations and guidance and answered  stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8, 2008,  meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft  preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders'

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questions on how these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.     On January 9, 2009, the NRC staff provided the proposed rule to the  Commission in SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to  Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR [Title 10 of the Code of  Federal Regulations] part 50).'' In its SRM to SECY-09-0007, dated  April 16, 2009, the Commission approved the publication of the proposed  rule. The NRC published the proposed rule on the enhancements to EP  regulations for public comment in the Federal Register on May 18, 2009  (74 FR 23254). Because it received several requests to lengthen the  public comment period, the NRC extended the deadline for the public  comment period from August 3, 2009, to October 19, 2009. During the  public comment period, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA) jointly held 11 public meetings to discuss the proposed  rule and related guidance documents. The NRC received a total of 94  submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were  identified.     On December 8, 2009, NRC and FEMA staff briefed the Commission on  the status of the EP rulemaking and comments received during the public  comment period. In addition, a panel of external stakeholders briefed  the Commission on their comments and views regarding the proposed rule.  In SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed Rule:  Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, 9:30 a.m., Tuesday,  December 8, 2009, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint  North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January  13, 2010, the Commission directed the NRC staff to continue working  with FEMA in considering comments from State and local officials, and  other interested stakeholders, to enhance the EP regulations and  guidance. The Commission also directed the NRC staff to address the  impacts of the rule and to consider providing a public draft of the  rule language and guidance documents via the NRC public Web site while  working with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the draft  final rule.     On November 15, 2010, the NRC and FEMA held a public meeting to  discuss the proposed implementation dates for the EP final rule. The  feedback from this meeting, as well as all the previous interactions,  informed the NRC's schedule for the implementation of the new EP  requirements.

II. Discussion

    The final rule applies to 10 CFR part 50 licensees that are  currently subject to the EP requirements. The final rule similarly  applies to certain applicants for construction permits under Part 50  with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for coping with  emergencies (Sec.  50.34(a)(10)), operating licenses under Part 50  (Sec.  50.34(b)(6)(v)), early site permits under Part 52 that choose to  propose either major features of an, or a complete and integrated,  emergency plan (Sec.  52.17(b)(2)), and combined licenses under Part 52  (Sec.  52.79(a)(21)). A discussion of which applicants may defer  compliance with the requirements of this final rule is provided in  Section V of this document.     An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating  event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident.  Emergency preparedness cannot affect the probability of the initiating  event, but a high level of EP increases the probability of accident  mitigation if the initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial  operator actions. As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is  not normally quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the  level of EP could affect the outcome of an accident in that the  accident may be mitigated by the actions of the ERO or, in the worst  case, consequences to the public could be reduced through the effective  use of protective actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this  manner enhance protection of public health and safety through  improvements in the response to unlikely initiating events that could  lead to severe accidents without mitigative response.     The NRC's EP requirements are based on 16 planning standards in  Sec.  50.47(b) that apply to onsite and offsite emergency response  plans. The planning standards apply to onsite and offsite plans  because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC looks at the  application (or the licensee's activities in the case of existing  facilities), the current State and local government emergency plans,  and FEMA's recommendation, which is based on the content of the State  and local plans. The FEMA regulations in 44 CFR part 350 also contain  these planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on  the adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local  governments to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only  offsite (State and local government) plans. The changes to Sec.   50.47(b) in this final rule are designed to affect the onsite plans,  not the offsite plans. The changes have been written in a way that is  expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA regulations.     This final rule does not affect the findings necessary for issuance  of a renewed nuclear power operating license under 10 CFR part 54. As  the Commission explained in the license renewal final rule (56 FR  64943; December 13, 1991) and again in revisions to that final rule (60  FR 22461; May 8, 1995), the scope of license renewal is limited to  those issues that have a specific relevance to protecting the public  health and safety during the license renewal period (i.e., age-related  degradation). Issues relevant to current plant operations, like  emergency planning, fall within the purview of the current regulatory  process and continue into the extended operation period of a license  renewal. See also NUREG-1412, ``Foundation for the Adequacy of the  Licensing Bases,'' dated December 1991. The Commission has affirmed  repeatedly that ``emergency preparedness need not be reviewed again for  license renewal,'' 71 FR 74848, 74852; December 13, 2006 (referencing  56 FR at 64966). The Commission stated that ``[t]hrough its standards  and required exercises, the Commission ensures that existing plans are  adequate throughout the life of any plant even in the face of changing  demographics and other site-related factors.'' 71 FR at 74852 (quoting  56 FR at 64966). This basic determination is reflected in the NRC's  regulations at Sec.  50.47(a), in which a new finding on emergency  planning issues is not required for license renewal.     The discussion of the amendments in this final rule is divided into  two sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section  II.B for non-security related EP issues. The security-related issues  are topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in  Order EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related  issues are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive  review of EP regulations and guidance.

A. Security-Related EP Issues

    The NRC is enhancing its EP regulations by incorporating changes  that clearly address EP actions for hostile action. Some of the changes  are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was issued to ensure  adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense  and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026, however, the  Commission took several additional steps to ensure

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adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense  and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access  Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13,  2003); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification  Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24514;  May 7, 2003); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,''  issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003); the Design Basis  Threat (DBT) final rule (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007); and the Power  Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009).  As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission  has determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate  protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.  Therefore, the EP changes in this final rule that are based on the  requirements of Order EA-02-026 are not necessary to ensure adequate  protection during hostile action. These amendments are considered  enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, licensees'  implementation of these enhancements will result in a substantial  increase in EP and the protection of public health and safety. 1. On-Shift Staffing Analysis     The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned  to emergency plan implementation functions may have numerous tasks or  multiple responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of  their assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift  responsibilities are addressed in Sec.  50.47(b)(2) and Part 50,  Appendix E, Section IV.A. The former regulations did not specifically  require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan  implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without  having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from  performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC regulations and  guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some  flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to  emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate  completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event.  The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at  Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to  problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for  emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:      A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the  licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel  (communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and  perform numerous response actions required by the event resulted in a  heavy workload for the shift staff.      A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another  plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event,  notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating  procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff  contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of  Unusual Event.     The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise  On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective  implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering  expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a  shift technical advisor (STA) to provide engineering and accident  assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned additional  response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire brigade member,  which could have resulted in overburdening the control room staff  during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as fire  brigade leader, which could have hindered the STA from performing the  primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering  expertise.     After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated  that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued.  The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift  staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results  of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several  observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could  be a large workload for radiological support personnel during  emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant  staffing practices for performing response activities during two  accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with  complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation  and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included  the following:      Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for  establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.      Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant- specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by  licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.      Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed  personnel to staff the fire brigade.      Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and  non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed  operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.      Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the  licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.     Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for  regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to  on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee  revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and  assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As  previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to  provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC  determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate  reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in  effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q). In  April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the  assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech.) as the  interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented  ERO responder. The HP Tech. had assigned emergency plan tasks including  in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid.  The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate  assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and  assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency  plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q).     These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to  explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these  emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency  event. Having additional duties beyond the assigned emergency plan  implementation functions could result in on-shift responders being  overburdened, resulting in inadequate or untimely response.     The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff  responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient  number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan  and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some  licensees were utilizing security

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personnel to implement the emergency plan when many of these responders  would likely not be available due to a hostile action.     The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One  option was to take no action, but this alternative would not have  subjected new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's  requirement of an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated  security plan and emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the  shift staffing study referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees  surveyed did not use a systematic process for establishing shift  staffing levels and additional tasks, not required by regulation, were  assigned to the licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice, if  permitted to continue, could have resulted in operators being  overburdened during an emergency. A second option was to allow  licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift staffing.  However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to reduce on- shift staffing levels and the NRC would have expected this practice to  continue. This could have increased the risk of over-burdening on-shift  responders and resulted in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore,  both of these options were considered unacceptable.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power  plant licensees to provide a detailed analysis to show that on-shift  personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions were not  assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing  their assigned emergency plan functions. The NRC received several  comments on this proposal, questioning the need for this regulation and  suggesting that the proposed rule methodology should be placed in a  regulatory guide, NUREG, or some other guidance document. The NRC  disagrees with these comments and believes that a regulation is  necessary to ensure consistent licensee implementation of on-shift  emergency response staffing that is enforceable and not merely  guidance. Therefore, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section  IV.A, to address this issue, as discussed in Section IV of this  document.     In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether  the NRC should enhance its regulations to be more explicit in the  number of ERO staff necessary for response to nuclear power plant  emergencies. Specifically, the NRC requested comments on a draft  staffing table that provided proposed staff functions and minimum  staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting ERO. The table was a  modification of the guidance found in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency  Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,''  dated November 1980, and incorporated lessons learned from years of NRC  EP experience. Of the comments the NRC received, some comments  supported and some opposed the inclusion of the table into regulations.  The NRC acknowledges that because each site is different and site  characteristics may dictate the size of the ERO staff, requiring  compliance with standard staffing requirements would be an unreasonable  approach to resolving this issue. For example, the NRC has approved  some emergency plans with additional ERO staff due to site-specific  circumstances, such as the lack of a local fire department or hospital.  Therefore, the NRC is not specifying a standard ERO staffing table in  its regulations.     In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether  the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to  perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can  perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a  timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could  prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC  received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this  requirement. The NRC agrees that this requirement is not necessary for  non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is  generally small, which is commensurate with the need to operate the  facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety.  The NRC reviews the staffing as part of initial reactor licensing. The  functions of emergency staff are outlined in emergency plans and are  tested through drills and exercises in accordance with NUREG-0849,  ``Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans  for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated October 1983. Results are  reviewed by the NRC during routine inspections. Therefore, the NRC has  not included this requirement in the final rule. 2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action     Section 50.47(b)(4) stipulates that emergency plans must include a  standard emergency classification and EAL scheme. Part 50, Appendix E,  Section IV.B, specifies that emergency plans shall include EALs that  are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification of  State and local agencies, and participation of those agencies in  emergency response. However, the former regulations did not require  EALs for hostile action and did not address the issue of anticipatory  response to hostile action. Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02  addressed these issues, those improvements to the EAL requirements to  address hostile action were only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC  could not ensure consistent and effective implementation of these  enhancements among existing and future licensees.     Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least a Notification  of Unusual Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In  2005, the NRC issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples  for hostile action up to the General Emergency level. Bulletin BL-05-02  provided examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be  implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654,  NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action  Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, ``Methodology for  Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also pointed out that  because of improvements in Federal agencies' information-sharing and  assessment capabilities, hostile action emergency declarations can be  accomplished in a more anticipatory manner, based on a credible threat,  than the current method of making declarations for accidental events.  This would enable earlier implementation of emergency response actions.     Although all nuclear power reactor licensees have implemented both  the credible threat EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL  enhancements specified in BL-05-02, licensees were not required to  maintain the enhancements identified in the bulletin. This could have  resulted in inconsistent EAL implementation among licensees for  response to hostile action. Also, future licensees would not have been  required to include these enhancements in their emergency plans. This  final rule establishes consistent EALs across the nuclear power  industry for hostile action. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided  enhancements to EAL schemes that would allow event declarations to be  accomplished in a more anticipatory manner. This timeliness is of the  utmost importance because EALs are used as criteria for determining the  need for notification and participation of State and local agencies.  The NRC is

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codifying these enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile  action by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B, as discussed in  Section IV of this document.     The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these  issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by  licensees. These options were rejected since there would have continued  to be no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to  incorporate EALs for hostile action in their emergency plans, nor would  there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that the NRC had  determined to be adequate.     In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether  the NRC should expand to non-power reactor licensees the requirement  for power reactor licensees to have hostile action EALs. Appendix E to  10 CFR part 50 cites Regulatory Guide (RG) 2.6, ``Emergency Planning  for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983, as the guidance for  the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency plans.  Regulatory Guide 2.6 endorses ANSI/ANS 15.16-1982, ``Emergency Planning  for Research Reactors,'' as an acceptable approach to non-power reactor  emergency plans. The newly updated ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008 includes hostile  action EALs. The NRC has commenced the process to update RG 2.6 to  endorse ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008. The NRC has also determined that further  analysis and stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the  requirements for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has  not included a requirement in the final rule for non-power reactor  licensees to have hostile action EALs. 3. Emergency Response Organization Augmentation and Alternative  Facilities     Section 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, require  licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff within a  short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to assist in  mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members typically staff  an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) that relieves the control room  (CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff to focus on  reactor safety. The ERO members also staff an onsite Operational  Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage repair  teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in close  proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation and  coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal point of  information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities involved  in the response.     Section 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, require  licensees to have adequate emergency facilities and equipment to  support emergency response. However, Sec.  50.47(b)(8) and the former  Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, did not require licensees to  identify alternative facilities to support ERO augmentation during  hostile action. During hostile action, ERO members would likely not  have access to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if  it is located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless  these events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can  travel quickly to the site once access is allowed.     Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of  staffing plans at emergency response facilities during hostile action,  assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify alternative  facilities capable of supporting event response. These facilities would  function as staging areas for augmentation staff until the site was  secured, which would minimize delays in overall site response by  permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the danger of  hostile action. The NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of  the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the  identification and staffing of alternative emergency response  facilities.     Bulletin BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite  emergency response facilities support EP functions during hostile  action. It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner  that supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the  potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that  some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during  hostile action until the site was secured. However, the NRC considers  it prudent, for hostile action events outside of normal working hours,  to fully activate ERO members to promptly staff alternative facilities,  in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Bulletin BL-05-02  conveyed that, even during normal working hours, licensees should  consider deployment of onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility  near the site during hostile action.     To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory  action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as  a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue  Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute  Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile  Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action had been taken, there  would have continued to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding  the actions necessary during hostile action for the ERO to staff an  alternative facility. The ERO members would likely not have access to  the site during hostile action, but timely augmentation would still be  necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may have  resulted in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines,  and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using  a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those  developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, would not  provide a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed  enhancements for hostile action. The use of voluntary programs would  not have ensured long-term continuity of the enhancements for both  licensees and applicants. Thus, the NRC is codifying the ICM  requirement and the enhancement examples described in BL-05-02  concerning ERO augmentation to alternative facilities during hostile  action in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, to maximize the  effectiveness of the site response. These changes are discussed in  Section IV of this document. 4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During  Hostile Action     A unique challenge posed by hostile action at a nuclear power plant  is the increased demand on local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that  are expected to implement portions of ORO emergency plans, as well as  respond to the plant. The former Sec.  50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to  Part 50 did not explicitly require licensees to coordinate with OROs to  ensure that personnel are available to carry out preplanned actions,  such as traffic control and route alerting by LLEAs, during hostile  action directed at the plant.     Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency  response as well as demonstrate that various ORO capabilities exist  through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and OROs have  successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years. However,  the NRC recognized that hostile action may challenge OROs in ways  unforeseen at the time the current regulations were developed. For  example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned both

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evacuation plan and armed response duties during hostile action. The  NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-026 and  included provisions that licensees address coordination with OROs for  hostile action. Specifically, the order required that licensees develop  plans, procedures, and training regarding coordination between the site  and OROs and directed licensees to review emergency plans to ensure  sufficient numbers of personnel would be available during hostile  action.     The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and  communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure  sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during  hostile action. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and OROs  through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,''  dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based  on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF)  exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills  conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005.  In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that  conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every  nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource  planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile  action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the  NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees  concerning effective coordination with OROs regarding the availability  of adequate resources to respond to hostile action at a nuclear power  plant.     Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to  respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the  licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered  encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program;  however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved  means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11,  2001, threat environment. A voluntary approach would not have ensured  consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM requirements and  there would have been no requirement for new licensees to incorporate  the changes into their emergency plans.     The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to  explicitly include hostile action at the site as one of the types of  emergencies that define the State, local, and Federal agencies that  licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the  assistance licensees expect from them. These changes are discussed in  Section IV of this document. 5. Protection for Onsite Personnel     The former Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 did not  require specific emergency plan provisions to protect onsite emergency  responders and other onsite personnel in emergencies resulting from  hostile action at nuclear power plants. Licensees are required to  provide radiological protection for emergency workers and the public in  the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), including  actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for evacuation and  accountability of individuals, and providing for protective clothing  and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these personnel are required by  the site emergency plan that the licensee must follow and maintain. The  emergency plan requires responders with specific assignments to be  available on-shift 24 hours a day to minimize the impact of  radiological emergencies and provide for the protection of public  health and safety. However, in analyses performed after the terrorist  attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff determined that a lack of  protection for emergency responders who are expected to implement the  emergency plan could result in the loss of those responders and thus an  inability to effectively implement the emergency plan.     The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site  evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite  emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance  because these actions may place at risk the response personnel  necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action.  Bulletin BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those  normally prescribed may be more appropriate during hostile action,  particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as  evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and  accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise  actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the  location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures  would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely  and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.     The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue.  The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying  upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being  implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. Taking no action  could have resulted in the vulnerability of onsite personnel during  hostile action. Action is necessary to ensure effective coordination to  enable licensees to more effectively implement their pre-planned  actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved  means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the implementation  of voluntary actions would not have ensured that these measures would  be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.     The NRC is revising Appendix E by creating new Section IV.I, to  require licensees to protect onsite personnel during hostile action and  to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the  reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan, as  discussed in Section IV of this document. 6. Challenging Drills and Exercises     A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises  to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise  programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance  that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health  and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency.  Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance  of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear  plant site.     In the unlikely event that a licensee faces hostile action, the  response organization will encounter challenges that differ  significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise  programs because these programs have not included hostile action  scenarios. The former NRC regulations addressing this issue were  general in nature and did not explicitly require licensees to include  hostile action scenarios in drills and exercises, nor did they directly  allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC is amending  its regulations to do so.     Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC  conducted a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed  threat environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains  valid. The NRC observed licensee performance during numerous

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hostile action EP exercises and tabletop drills as well as several  security FOF exercises. The NRC also discussed security-based EP issues  with licensees and Federal, State, and local EP professionals and  advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to collect information from  licensees on the enhancements to drill and exercise programs to address  the hostile action contingency.     Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that, although EP measures  are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile  action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO  drills and exercises, such as:      Extensive coordination between operations, security, and  EP personnel;      Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for  activation of the ERO;      Execution of initial response actions in a hostile  environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);      The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or  aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during  radiological emergencies;      Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site  conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security  measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;      Conduct of operations and repair activities with large  areas of the plant damaged or on fire;      Rescue of, and medical attention to, significant numbers  of personnel; and      Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to  secure access to plant areas for repairs.     In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear power reactor licensees stated  that they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise  program. Program elements were captured in NEI 06-04, Rev. 1,  ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,'' a  guidance document developed by NEI. The NRC endorsed this document for  use in a pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to  Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a  Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19,  2008. However, implementation of these enhancements was voluntary, and  the NRC could not require licensees to maintain these enhancements,  absent issuance of an order or a regulation.     The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise  scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises  and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed  many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations.  Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local  agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that  facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable  and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency  classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release.  Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor  accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent  containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used  by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as  a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However,  certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise  scenarios, including the following:      The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident  before a release occurs;      The release will occur after a General Emergency is  declared;      The release will be terminated before the exercise ends;  and      The exercise will escalate sequentially through the  emergency classes.     In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences  that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically  face.     In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the  NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as  follows:

    The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency  planning exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory  responses associated with preconditioning of participants by  incorporating a wide spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no  release to a large release) and events, including security-based  events. These scenarios should emphasize the expected interfaces and  coordination between key decision-makers based on realistic  postulated events. The staff should share experiences of  preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.

    As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed  to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The  working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA  regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios  and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these  regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA  Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport  with this final rule to address preconditioning and the incorporation  of hostile action exercise scenarios.     The FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to  discuss potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC  supported these meetings to facilitate questions as they related to the  EP rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example,  stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development  and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification  levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs  can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could  vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more  realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the  different focus groups and stakeholders informed this rulemaking, new  guidance documents associated with this rulemaking, and an update to  the REP Program Manual.     A regulatory change is necessary to enhance scenario content to  include hostile action scenarios and reduce preconditioning through a  wide spectrum of challenges. This change will improve licensee ERO  capability to protect public health and safety under all accident  scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward preconditioning.     The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations,  but rejected that option because it would not adequately address the  concerns previously discussed. The NRC also discussed the use of  voluntary programs and although this option could be successful, the  NRC could not require that changes made would be permanent and  consistent across all sites.     The NRC is revising Appendix E, Section IV.F, to address these  issues, as discussed in Section IV of this document.

B. Non-Security Related EP Issues

    The remaining changes are new or amended requirements that result  in a substantial increase to public health and safety because they  maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to effectively  implement their emergency plans. 1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems     The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS)  capabilities are found in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E,  Section IV.D.3, and require licensees to establish the capability to  promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event  while meeting certain ANS design objectives.

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The former regulations did not require backup power for sirens or other  backup ANS alerting capabilities when a major portion of the primary  alerting means is unavailable. The regulations also did not address  backup notification capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's  ANS is unavailable and no backup exists, then the public may not be  promptly alerted of an event at the facility and the protective actions  to be taken, which could affect the public's response to the event.     An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace  within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case  of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions  may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear  power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to  provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such  as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or  supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives  information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency  alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile  loudspeakers.     In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major  portion of the alert function of an ANS for short time periods for  various reasons, such as damage to ANS components caused by severe  weather, loss of offsite alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of  ANS activation equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS  hardware/software modifications. In other situations, the notification  capability has been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert  radios, which are used to provide both an alert signal and notification  function).     The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when  ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to  Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and  Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26,  2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System  Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28,  ``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated  December 22, 2006. The inability to activate some tone alert radios  because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS  implementation was addressed in IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert  Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,''  dated April 2, 1996. Without the ability to warn the population, the  effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced.  Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of  the primary ANS.     Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread  loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren based systems,  such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern  U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in RG 1.155,  ``Station Blackout,'' dated August 1988, although the likelihood of  failure of the onsite AC [alternating current] power system  coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout  events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some  plants.     The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification  systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and  encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In  U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (House  Appropriations Committee) Report 107-740, FEMA was directed to update  its guidance on outdoor warning and mass notification systems and  require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an AC  power supply. The House Appropriations Committee also urged FEMA to  consult with other relevant agencies and revise the national standard  for outdoor warning and mass notification to reflect state-of-the-art  technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the  Commission to require backup power for the emergency notification  system, including siren systems, for nuclear power plants located where  there is a permanent population, as determined by the 2000 decennial  census, in excess of 15,000,000 within a 50 mile radius of the power  plant. Therefore, it was appropriate that the NRC also considered  changes to its existing regulations and guidance regarding warning  systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.     The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this  issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related  guidance documents to address ANS backup means. Several NRC and FEMA  guidance documents, such as NUREG-0654 and FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the  Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power  Plants,'' dated November 1985, contain detailed information on ANS  capabilities and design review methodology. Additional information on  ANS backup capabilities will be provided in revisions or supplements to  these documents. As guidance, a provision for an ANS backup means would  not be considered a requirement and its applicability to existing  approved ANS designs would be considered optional. As noted previously  in this discussion, FEMA was also directed to update its guidance to  require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an  alternating current power supply. However, guidance changes limited to  backup power requirements for the alerting function would not address  backup capabilities for other types of alerting devices or the ANS  notification function. In summary, this option did not provide a  regulatory resolution to ensure that nuclear power plant ANS designs  include a backup method to the primary means for both alerting and  notification, and thus the NRC considered this option to be  unacceptable.     Use of a voluntary approach for ANS backup means was also  considered. Some current nuclear power plant ANS designs address one or  more aspects of backup ANS capabilities, such as providing backup power  in the event primary power to sirens is lost, using backup route  alerting when sirens are inoperable, designating multiple EAS broadcast  stations to ensure that instructional messages can be transmitted, or  using reverse 911 systems. A voluntary approach was considered as an  option because State and local authorities can usually compensate for  the temporary loss of some ANS capabilities. However, allowing  licensees or applicants to voluntarily install backup ANS capabilities  will not ensure that both the alerting and notification functions are  addressed, or that new sites will have warning systems designed with  comprehensive backup ANS capabilities. Given the importance of ANS to  alert the public of an event at a facility and the protective actions  to be taken, and without any voluntary industry commitment that  existing or new warning systems will have a backup means available, the  NRC considered a voluntary approach to be inappropriate and found this  option unacceptable.     The NRC believes that nuclear power reactor licensees must be  required to have backup ANS methods and therefore is amending its  regulations to address backup capabilities for both the alert and  notification functions. The NRC considered three alternatives for  addressing this issue in rulemaking.     The first alternative would have added a regulatory requirement for  ANS backup power. The most common warning system used at U.S. nuclear

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power plants is based on sirens that are powered directly, or  indirectly through batteries, by an AC power source. As noted  previously in this discussion, the loss of power is not the only  failure mode that can impact warning systems. Causes of past ANS  inoperability problems have included the inability to detect siren  failures, the inability to activate sirens, the failure to test and  maintain personal home alerting devices, the use of telephone call- inhibiting devices, and the failure to provide and maintain  distribution lists of tone alert radios. Thus, a regulatory requirement  addressing only backup ANS power would not have eliminated any of these  other failure modes. This approach would have prescribed one specific  method as a backup means, precluding licensees (or applicants) and  offsite officials from considering alternative methods, such as route  alerting or newer communications technology, that may be more suitable  for certain nuclear power plant sites. In summary, it would have  addressed only one of several ANS failure modes (i.e., loss of AC  power) for one alerting method (i.e., sirens). It would not have  addressed backup methods for other types of alerting devices or any  part of the notification process. Therefore, the NRC considered this  approach to be unacceptable.     The second alternative would have required that the primary ANS be  designed so no common single failure mode for the system existed;  therefore, a backup system would not have been needed. This approach  would have ensured that the entire ANS was designed and built to a very  high level of reliability. Any equipment necessary for ANS activation  and operation (e.g., computers, radio transmitters and radio towers,  plus the actual alerting devices and notification means) would have had  redundant components and power sources as necessary to eliminate any  common single failure mode, such as a widespread power outage affecting  a siren based system. However, ensuring that all ANS common single  failure vulnerabilities have been identified and adequately addressed  would have been difficult. Even after extensive analysis and testing of  a warning system, a common failure mechanism may not have become  evident until the system was activated for an emergency event. For a  siren based system, several additional sirens (with backup power  capabilities) may have been needed to be installed to provide  overlapping acoustic coverage in the event clusters of sirens fail and  thus may have discouraged licensees at future nuclear power plant sites  from using these systems due to the increased cost for installing  additional sirens. This approach may not have been applicable to non- electronic primary warning systems based on other methods, such as  route alerting. For these reasons, the NRC considered this approach to  be unacceptable. Rejecting this approach does not mean that the issue  of backup power for warning systems will be left unaddressed. As  discussed previously, the House Committee on Appropriations directed  FEMA to require all outdoor warning systems to be operable in the  absence of AC power.     The third alternative was selected and revises Part 50, Appendix E,  Section IV.D.3, to require a backup capability should the primary means  of public alerting and notification be unavailable. These changes are  discussed in Section IV of this document. 2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness     Emergency declaration is the process by which a licensee determines  whether an off-normal plant condition warrants declaration as an  emergency and, if so, which of the four emergency classes--Notification  of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency--is  to be declared. In its oversight of licensee EP programs, the NRC has  observed several licensees whose responses in performing emergency  declarations were inappropriately delayed. Between 2000 and 2009, the  NRC identified 13 situations in which an emergency declaration was  either not done or inappropriately delayed during an actual event,  which resulted in findings and cited and non-cited violations. These  situations may have been a result of a lack of a specific regulatory  timeliness requirement.     Emergency declarations are fundamental to the licensee's EP program  in that onsite and offsite emergency response activities are  implemented in a staged, proportional manner, based upon the level of  the declared emergency. If an emergency declaration is delayed, the  subsequent emergency response actions may not be timely. Emergency  response personnel, facilities, and equipment may not be in position  should it become necessary to implement measures to protect public  health and safety.     The NRC has issued generic communications to alert licensees of  these concerns and to advise them of the NRC's expectation that  emergency classifications \1\ are made in a prompt manner. In 1985, the  NRC published IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class,  Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications,'' to  alert licensees of two instances in which declarations and/or  notifications of an actual emergency condition were significantly  delayed and to express the NRC expectation of timely emergency  declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it necessary to publish Emergency  Preparedness Position-2, ``Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on  Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions,'' to provide  guidance to NRC staff in evaluating licensee performance in the area of  timely classification. The NRC cited classification delays in actual  events and exercises as the reason for issuing the guidance. The EPPOS- 2 provided the NRC expectation that the classification should be made  promptly following indications that conditions have reached an EAL  threshold and that 15 minutes was a reasonable goal for completing the  classification once indications are available to the control room  operators. The NRC based that conclusion on the belief that 15 minutes  is a reasonable period of time for assessing and classifying an  emergency once indications are available to cognizant personnel, and  that a delay in classification for up to 15 minutes would have a  minimal impact upon the overall emergency response and protection of  the public health and safety. The NRC noted that emergency  classification schemes have reached a level of maturity in which the  classification of emergencies can be accomplished in a relatively short  period of time once the abnormal condition and associated plant  parameters are known by cognizant licensee personnel. The EPPOS-2  stated that the 15-minute period was not to be viewed as a grace period  in which a licensee could resolve a condition that had already exceeded  an EAL threshold to avoid a declaration. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Early NRC generic communications routinely used the phrase  ``emergency classification'' to denote the outcome of the process to  assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition. This document  uses the phrase ``emergency declaration'' in place of ``emergency  classification'' except when summarizing an earlier document. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This 15-minute goal was not a regulatory requirement but rather a  guideline for NRC staff evaluation of a licensee's performance in  responding to an actual radiological emergency. This goal was  subsequently incorporated as a criterion in the industry proposed and  NRC-approved Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone performance  indicators (PIs). Although the reported classification performance

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during drills and exercises remains high, there have been several  instances during actual events in which classifications were  inappropriately delayed. Although these actual events did not warrant  public protective measures, this may not always be the case.     The NRC considered the following options for addressing this  regulatory problem. The first option, take no action, was rejected  because it would not address the regulatory problem. The second option,  continue to rely on the industry's voluntary PI, was rejected because  the existence of the PI has not prevented untimely classifications  during actual emergencies. Although these occurrences were associated  with Notification of Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed weaknesses  could also have occurred under different circumstances in which the  potential impact to the public could have been greater. The third  option, issue regulatory guidance, was rejected because although  regulatory guidance is an appropriate mechanism for identifying  acceptable means for complying with regulatory requirements, there was  no regulatory requirement that emergency declarations meet any  particular timeliness criterion. The fourth option, an amendment of the  regulations, is the best course of action to ensure that licensees are  aware that they are responsible for completing emergency declarations  in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency.     The NRC also considered providing either a performance criterion or  a capability criterion. Similar to the notification timeliness  criterion in Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which the NRC requires  licensees to be capable of notifying responsible State and local  governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency,  the NRC opted to propose a capability criterion, rather than an  inflexible performance criterion. This approach allows licensees some  degree of flexibility during an actual radiological emergency in  addressing extenuating circumstances that may arise when an emergency  declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of performing plant  operations that are more urgently needed to protect public health and  safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did not deny  State and local authorities the opportunity to implement actions to  protect the public health or safety under their emergency plans and the  cause of the delay was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to  foresee and prevent. Based upon these considerations, the NRC is  amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, to address this issue by  providing a capability criterion. These changes are discussed in  Section IV of this document.     In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether  the NRC should add requirements for non-power reactor licensees to  assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes  and promptly declare an emergency condition. The NRC received several  comments on these issues. The NRC believes there may be a need for the  NRC to be aware of security related events early on so that an  assessment can be made to consider the likelihood that the event is  part of a larger coordinated attack.     The NRC also believes declarations for non-security related events  should be made in a timely fashion, but not necessarily with the same  urgency as security related events. For example, in 2008 a tornado  damaged the building that houses a non-power reactor. Assistance from  the NRC, which was coordinated between NRC headquarters and NRC Region  IV, could have been deployed earlier and with more detailed information  if the emergency information was available to the NRC earlier.     However, the NRC has determined that further analysis and  stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the requirements  for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has not included  requirements in the final rule for non-power reactor licensees to  assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes  and promptly declare an emergency condition. 3. Emergency Operations Facility--Performance Based Approach     Several nuclear power reactor licensees have submitted requests for  NRC approval to combine EOFs for plants they operate within a State or  in multiple States into a consolidated EOF. In some instances, the  consolidated EOF is located at a substantial distance from one or more  of the plant sites and is no longer considered a ``near-site''  facility, as required by former Sec. Sec.  50.47(b)(3), 50.47(d)(1),  50.54(gg)(1)(i), and Appendix E, Sections II.H., IV.E.8., IV.E.9.c.,  and IV.E.9.d. Guidance documents, including NUREG-0696, ``Functional  Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,'' dated February 1981, and  NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,''  Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,''  dated January 1983, that provide criteria for establishing and locating  emergency response facilities also refer to the EOF as a near-site  facility. However, the regulations and guidance did not explicitly  define the term ``near-site.'' This regulatory structure resulted in  confusion for licensees with reasonable technical bases for moving or  consolidating EOFs that would no longer be considered ``near-site'' and  led to requests for exceptions to NRC guidance and exemptions from NRC  regulations to move or consolidate their EOFs.     In addition, neither regulations nor guidance documents addressed  the capabilities and functional requirements for a consolidated EOF,  such as capabilities for handling simultaneous events at two or more  sites, or having provisions for the NRC and offsite officials to  relocate to a facility nearer the site if they desire. Thus, licensees  have been uncertain about when they need to submit requests for  exceptions or exemptions, which alternative approaches to existing EOF  distance and other facility criteria may be acceptable, and what  additional capabilities they need to address for a consolidated EOF. A  regulatory mechanism (Sec.  50.54(q)) is already in place that allows  licensees to make changes to their emergency plans without prior  Commission approval when certain conditions are met. This mechanism  could have been applied to consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria  had been established. In the absence of clear criteria, several recent  licensee requests to consolidate EOFs have been evaluated by the NRC  staff and reviewed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.     Each nuclear power plant site is required to have an EOF where the  licensee provides overall management of its resources in response to an  emergency and coordinates emergency response activities with Federal,  State, local, and Tribal agencies. The original EOF siting criteria  called for the facility to be located near the nuclear power reactor  site and imposed a 20-mile upper limit (later modified by the  Commission to 25 miles) for the distance between the site and the EOF.  This upper limit was generally considered to be the maximum distance  from the nuclear power reactor site within which face-to-face  communications between the licensee, offsite officials, and NRC staff  could be facilitated, and which also permitted the timely briefing and  debriefing of personnel going to and from the site. However, advances  in computer and communication technology after the original EOF siting  criteria were established now allow EOF functions to be effectively  performed independent of

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distance from the site. Computer based systems allow plant parameter,  meteorological data, and radiological information for multiple sites to  be collected, analyzed, trended, and displayed in a remotely located  facility. Data and voice communications between the EOF and other  onsite/offsite emergency response facilities can be addressed through a  variety of independent systems, such as microwave, telephone, internet,  intranet, and radio, which provide a high degree of availability and  reliability.     Furthermore, nuclear utility consolidation has resulted in  initiatives to standardize fleet emergency plans, use consolidated  EOFs, and staff EOFs by designated corporate personnel. Standardized  plans, implementing procedures, and accident assessment tools, such as  a common dose projection model, allow emergency responders in a  consolidated facility to effectively perform their functions for  multiple sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site facility.  Consolidated facilities eliminate the need to duplicate work space,  displays, communication networks, and other capabilities for each site.  Consolidated facilities can also be located at or near corporate  offices where nuclear support personnel designated to fill EOF  positions can respond more quickly.     The Commission, in the SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear  Operating Company's Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating  Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005,  directed the NRC staff to consider resolving these issues through  rulemaking. In that SRM, the Commission approved the proposal for a  consolidated EOF for three nuclear power reactor sites operated by  Southern Nuclear Operating Company at the company's corporate  headquarters. The Commission also instructed the NRC staff to consider  making ``the requirements for EOFs more performance based to allow  other multi-plant licensees to consolidate their EOFs, if those  licensees can demonstrate their emergency response strategies will  adequately cope with an emergency at any one of the associated  plants.''     To address the EOF ``near-site'' and consolidation issues, the NRC  considered maintaining EOF distance criteria as guidance only and to  specify other EOF criteria in guidance rather than in the regulations.  However, providing these criteria as guidance only would not have  ensured that future applicants would follow the criteria. Thus, an EOF  could have been located within 10 miles of a site with no backup  facility provided, or could have been located beyond 25 miles of a site  without providing a facility closer to a site for NRC site team and  offsite response personnel. An EOF could have been implemented without  meeting the performance based criteria. A licensee could have relocated  or consolidated an existing approved facility without meeting all or  some of the criteria and without prior Commission approval as long as  the licensee determined that the provisions of Sec.  50.54(q) were met.  Under these circumstances, an EOF could have been implemented that may  not have provided all of the capabilities that the NRC believes are  necessary for such a facility to be fully effective. Therefore, the NRC  determined that this option would not have been appropriate.     The NRC also considered revising the regulations (and providing  associated performance based criteria) to allow an EOF to be located  more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site without prior  Commission approval. The capability of existing EOFs located more than  25 miles from a site to function as effective emergency response  facilities has been demonstrated in numerous exercises and several  actual events. However, the NRC is concerned that locating an EOF  beyond 25 miles from a site could adversely impact the ability of  licensee and offsite responders to fulfill their responsibilities  (e.g., due to increased response times to a remotely located facility  or less effective communications with responders at other locations).  The potential adverse impacts of the EOF location must be fully  considered and addressed, including consideration of the needs of  offsite officials who also report to the EOF. Therefore, the NRC  determined that the option to allow licensees to locate EOFs more than  25 miles from a site without prior Commission review and approval would  not have been appropriate.     In summary, the NRC is amending its regulations (and associated  guidance) to establish performance based criteria for all EOFs based on  requirements and conditions previously imposed by the Commission on  these facilities. Licensees will need to obtain prior Commission  approval and provide a facility closer to the site in situations where  the EOF is more than 25 miles from a site. This approach will ensure  that an EOF has the capabilities necessary to be fully effective  regardless of its location with respect to the nuclear power plant  site, and that provisions are in place for a facility closer to the  site for use by NRC site teams and offsite responders. The NRC is also  amending its regulations (and guidance) to remove the references to an  EOF as a ``near-site'' facility and to incorporate specific EOF  distance criteria into the regulations, as discussed in Section IV of  this document.     In a conforming change, the NRC is revising Sec.  52.79(a)(17) to  clarify that combined license applications need not address the  requirement governing TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv).  Instead, the requirements in Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i) apply.  That section accurately reflects the need for the combined license  application to address an EOF; by contrast Sec.  50.34(f)(2)(xxv)  requires only applicants for construction permits (and not combined  licenses) to address an EOF. The NRC considered, as an alternative to  modifying Sec.  52.79(a)(17), correcting Sec.  50.34(f)(xxv) to remove  the language limiting the requirement to address an EOF to construction  permit applications. The NRC decided not to adopt that approach, but  instead have the general requirements for EP, including Appendix E,  apply to combined license applications by virtue of Sec.  52.79(a)(21). 4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating     The former Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E, Sections  II.G, III, and IV, required nuclear power plant operating license  applicants to provide evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for the public  located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ. These ETEs are used in the  planning process to identify potential challenges to efficient  evacuation, such as traffic constraints, and, in the event of an  accident, to assist the onsite and offsite emergency response managers  in making appropriate decisions regarding the protection of the public.  The former regulations did not require any review or revision of ETEs  following the initial licensing of the plant. Although some licensees  do revise ETEs based on updated census data, the use of ETEs in  evacuation planning is inconsistent and generally does not affect the  development of public protective action strategies.     Nuclear power reactor operating license applicants are responsible  for developing the ETE analysis for their respective sites. They submit  the analysis to the NRC in support of their emergency plans, usually as  a stand-alone document. Within the ETE analysis, there are multiple ETE  values for different scenarios developed for combinations of variables  and events under varying conditions. For example,

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there are different ETE values based on season (summer or winter), day  of the week (midweek or weekend), time of day (daytime or evening), and  weather conditions (normal or adverse). Applicants include the results  of the ETE analysis in the onsite emergency plan and in the emergency  plan implementing procedures for protective action recommendations. The  ETEs are also in the offsite emergency plans for the State and local  governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.     In NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3,  Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,''  dated December 2007, the NRC presented the results of a study of its  protective action recommendation guidance. The NRC concluded in the  study that ETE information is important in developing public protective  action strategies and should be used to identify enhancements to  evacuation plans. The effectiveness of protective action recommendation  strategies is sensitive to the ETE, and therefore, it is important to  reduce the uncertainties associated with ETE numerical values.  Improving the accuracy of ETE values helps licensees recommend and  offsite officials determine the most appropriate protective action. For  instance, in the study, the NRC determined that for some scenarios  sheltering may be more protective than immediate evacuation if the  evacuation time is longer than a few hours, depending on site-specific  factors. Further, the NRC concluded that the effect of population  change upon evacuation times should be understood by OROs and  incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.     To address this issue, the NRC is amending the regulations to  require licensees to assess changes to the EPZ population. The NRC  believed that changes in infrastructure, or addition of a large  subdivision to the EPZ, could also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted  with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), who are experts in emergency  evacuations and have researched and developed several NRC studies  related to evacuation (e.g., NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation  Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005, NUREG/ CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency  Evacuations,'' January 2005, and NUREG/CR-6953). Based upon their  expert opinion, SNL confirmed that the major contributor to changes in  ETE values is changes in population. Population changes have a direct  correlation to the volume of vehicles on the roadway, which directly  affects the roadway capacity. Although changes in infrastructure can  impact roadway capacity, changes sufficient to impact the ETE by more  than a few minutes, such as the addition of an interstate highway, take  many years to plan and construct. Because population changes occur  continuously, change in population is considered the more appropriate  metric to monitor the potential effect on roadway capacity. Therefore,  the NRC is revising the regulations to explicitly require ETE updates  based on population changes that cause the ETE values within the  analysis to exceed a specified threshold.     The NRC also considered using guidance as a means to solve the  problem of the lack of specificity in regulations directing applicants  and licensees on the periodicity for updating ETEs. Although the  availability of more detailed guidance would provide applicants and  licensees with the tools to better update their ETEs, this option would  not have provided the regulatory means for enforcing the desired  frequency of ETE updates and consistency of ETE determinations.     Therefore, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Part 50,  Appendix E, Section IV, to require the periodic review and updating of  ETEs. The NRC guidance for completing the ETE analysis and required ETE  updates is contained in NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of  Evacuation Time Estimate Studies.'' 5. Amended Emergency Plan Change Process     Applicants for operating licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power  reactors, research reactors, and certain fuel facilities, and early  site permits (as applicable) and combined licenses under Part 52 for  nuclear power plants, are required by regulation to develop emergency  plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 and, for  nuclear power reactor license applicants, the standards of Sec.   50.47(b). After the facility license was issued, the holder of the  license was required by the former Sec.  50.54(q) to follow and  maintain in effect emergency plans that met the requirements of  Appendix E and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the standards of  Sec.  50.47(b). The former Sec.  50.54(q) also provided a process under  which a licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan  without prior NRC approval provided the changes would not decrease the  effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as  modified, would continue to meet applicable regulations. However, the  NRC determined that the language of the former Sec.  50.54(q) did not  clearly describe the requirements the NRC intended to impose on  licensees, leading to confusion and inefficiencies in implementation.     A licensee must follow and maintain the effectiveness of its  emergency plan if the NRC is to continue to find, under Sec.   50.54(s)(2)(ii), that there is reasonable assurance that adequate  protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a  radiological emergency. The EP regulations generally refer to the  onsite emergency plan as a stand-alone document. However, an emergency  plan relies upon facility capabilities, equipment, and resources that  are typically outside of the control of the licensee's emergency  planning organization. The NRC has identified several occurrences in  which licensee personnel outside of the emergency planning group have  changed the status of capabilities and resources under their cognizance  without considering the impact on the effectiveness of the emergency  plan or without alerting the emergency planning group.     Several enforcement actions in the past few years have been  associated with EALs being rendered ineffective by configuration  changes made to instruments referenced in an EAL without the change  being reflected in the EAL, or without a compensatory action being put  into place. Examples include modifications to installed seismic  instruments that eliminated the direct readout of acceleration needed  for classifying a seismic event and changes in reactor vessel level  criteria (in a boiling water reactor) being made without a conforming  change being made to the EAL. In another finding, concrete barriers  installed in a security-initiated change blocked a site access road  required by the emergency plan to be used for site evacuation. Another  licensee failed to provide adequate oversight on utility (external to  the plant) personnel maintaining the site's ANS, resulting in  degradation of that system and subsequent enforcement actions. Based on  its experience in reviewing root cause analyses and corrective actions  associated with inspection findings, the NRC believes that an  underlying cause of these occurrences is often that the licensees'  configuration control programs did not adequately consider the impact  of configuration changes on the effectiveness of their emergency plans.     The NRC determined that the phrase ``maintain in effect'' in the  former Sec.  50.54(q) was not adequately clear in conveying the NRC  expectation that an effective emergency plan also requires maintaining  the various capabilities and resources identified and relied on in the

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plan. The phrase ``maintain in effect,'' as applied to an emergency  plan in Sec.  50.54(q), has two senses: The first is that the plans are  in force; the second is that the plans can achieve the desired result  of providing reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can  and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.  Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) to clarify that the  regulatory intent is both senses by requiring licensees to follow and  ``maintain the effectiveness'' of their approved emergency plans.     The former Sec.  50.54(q) also provided a process under which a  licensee could make changes to its approved emergency plan without  prior NRC approval provided the changes did not decrease the  effectiveness of the emergency plan as approved and the plan, as  modified, continued to meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC approval  was required for any change that decreased the effectiveness of the  emergency plan. The NRC and licensees experienced significant  difficulties in implementing this portion of Sec.  50.54(q) because the  former rule language did not define what constituted a decrease in  effectiveness of an emergency plan nor did it identify the type of  changes that would constitute a decrease in effectiveness of the plan.  The lack of clear evaluation criteria resulted in regulatory  inefficiencies, such as licensees submitting for review changes that  did not rise to the level requiring prior NRC approval and enforcement  actions due to licensees failing to submit changes that were later  deemed to warrant such a review. A large fraction of the enforcement  actions in the EP Cornerstone can be attributed to these findings.     The NRC attempted to resolve this issue through the publication of  regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC issued EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan  and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' to provide guidance to NRC  inspectors regarding their review of licensees' emergency plan changes.  In 2004, the NEI submitted two white papers proposing a definition of  ``decrease in effectiveness'' for NRC consideration. The NRC could not  reach consensus with NEI and thus, did not endorse the NEI guidance. In  2005, the NRC withdrew EPPOS-4 and issued RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the  Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005,  to (1) Clarify the meaning of ``decrease in effectiveness,'' (2)  clarify the process for making changes to an emergency plan, and (3)  provide some examples of changes that are not decreases in  effectiveness. Although RIS 2005-02 provided useful guidance, the NRC  and NEI have continued to discuss ways to improve the Sec.  50.54(q)  change process, including the use of a regulatory framework parallel to  that of Sec.  50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance programs, Sec.   50.54(p)(2) for safeguards plans, and Sec.  50.59, ``Changes, Tests,  and Experiments.''     During the development of this rulemaking, the NRC identified a  concern regarding the process to be used by the NRC for reviewing  proposed emergency plan changes. The former Sec.  50.54(q) directed the  licensee to submit such changes under the provisions of Sec.  50.4,  which provides the procedures for making certain submissions to the  NRC. Some confusion existed as to whether all proposed emergency plan  changes submitted under Sec.  50.4 would result in a decrease in  effectiveness and whether Commission review of such submissions was  necessary. The final rule specifies that the license amendment process  of Sec.  50.90 is to be used when submitting a proposed emergency plan  change that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in  effectiveness of the plan. The final rule language addresses this  clarification. (See Section IV of this document for further  discussion.)     The NRC also considered other options for addressing the Sec.   50.54(q) problems. Using a voluntary industry initiative was rejected  because the NRC and NEI had yet to agree on the best approach to  resolve the problems. Issuing more regulatory guidance was rejected  because that approach had been tried but had not resolved the problems.  The NRC determined that an amendment to the regulations, supplemented  as necessary by regulatory guidance, is the best course of action to  ensure that (1) The effectiveness of the emergency plans is maintained,  (2) changes to the approved emergency plan are properly evaluated, and  (3) any change that reduces the effectiveness of the plan is reviewed  by the NRC prior to implementation.     Accordingly, the NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) to replace the  existing language and is making conforming changes in Part 50, Appendix  E, Section IV.B. The NRC is issuing RG 1.219, ``Guidance on Making  Changes to Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors,'' to describe a  method acceptable to the NRC for demonstrating compliance with the  final rule. 6. Removal of Completed One-Time Requirements     The NRC is eliminating several regulatory provisions that required  holders of licenses to take certain one-time actions to improve the  state of EP following the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. These  actions are complete and the requirements are no longer binding on any  current licensee. Corresponding requirements for license applicants are  provided in Sec. Sec.  50.33 and 50.34.     The requirements being removed are:     (1) Section 50.54(r), which required licensees of research or test  reactors to submit emergency plans to the NRC for approval by September  7, 1982, and, for the facilities with an authorized power level of less  than 2 MW thermal, by November 3, 1982. There is no longer a need for  this provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is  deleting this requirement and designating the section as ``reserved.''     (2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which required nuclear power reactor  licensees to submit State and local governmental emergency plans within  60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective date of the rule that added  Sec.  50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that date has elapsed. That portion  of Sec.  50.54(s)(1) that discussed the size of the EPZs was not  identified for deletion in the proposed rule, but after further review  the NRC has determined that it does not need to be retained. The size  of EPZs for nuclear power reactors is addressed in other parts of the  NRC's regulations. Section 50.33(g), which is applicable to the content  of new Part 50 and Part 52 applications (with complete and integrated  emergency plans), contains the same language regarding the size of EPZs  as found in Sec.  50.54(s)(1). Section 50.47(c)(2) also has the same  language regarding the size of EPZs as Sec. Sec.  50.33(g) and  50.54(s)(1). Moreover, Part 50, Appendix E, Section I, footnote 1,  addresses the size of EPZs with language equivalent to Sec. Sec.   50.33(g) and 50.54(s)(1). Therefore, the NRC is deleting Sec.   50.54(s)(1) in its entirety and designating the section as  ``reserved.''     (3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which required that nuclear power  reactor licensee, State, and local emergency response plans be  implemented by April 1, 1981. There is no longer a need for this  provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting  Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section as ``reserved.''     (4) Section 50.54(u), which required nuclear power reactor  licensees to submit, within 60 days of the November 3, 1980, effective  date of the rule that added Sec.  50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC plans  for coping with emergencies that meet the standards in Sec.  50.47(b)  and the requirements of Appendix E. There is no longer a need for this  provision because this requirement has expired. The NRC is deleting  this requirement

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and designating the section as ``reserved.''     The NRC is eliminating these completed one-time requirements in the  interest of regulatory clarity. Eliminating these requirements will not  relax any currently effective regulatory requirement and will cause no  regulatory burden on any current or future licensee or applicant.

III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule

A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings

    As part of its comprehensive assessment of the NRC's EP regulations  and guidance and development of this rule, the NRC staff met with  internal and external stakeholders, including FEMA management, on  numerous occasions including the following:     1. Meetings with NRC regional EP inspectors in January 2005 and  January 2006;     2. Meetings with State, local, and Tribal governments and nuclear  power industry representatives at the NREP Conference on April 11-14,  2005, March 27-30, 2006, and April 7-10, 2008;     3. Public meeting with interested stakeholders on August 31 and  September 1, 2005;     4. Public meeting with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on May  19, 2006;     5. Public meeting with the NEI/nuclear power industry  representatives on July 19, 2006;     6. Regional meetings with State and local representatives and  nuclear power industry working groups that started in 2007;     7. NRC Regulatory Information Conference on March 16, 2007;     8. Public meeting with external stakeholders on March 5, 2008;     9. Meeting with nuclear power industry representatives at the 2008  NEI EP and Communications Forum;     10. Public meeting with external stakeholders on July 8, 2008;     11. Public meetings to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to  EP regulations and related guidance documents in June 2009 held jointly  by the NRC and FEMA (a total of 11 public meetings);     12. Public meeting to discuss the proposed rule on enhancements to  EP regulations and related guidance documents on September 17, 2009;     13. Commission meeting to provide an overview of comments received  by the NRC and FEMA during the proposed rule public comment period and  remaining milestones in the EP rulemaking process on December 8, 2009;  and     14. Public meeting to discuss feedback on proposed implementation  dates for the final rule on November 15, 2010.     The NRC also met routinely with representatives of FEMA to  coordinate issues of mutual interest and to keep them informed of NRC  EP activities. These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA to collaborate on  rulemaking and guidance issues, and to ensure alignment and regulatory  consistency. In addition, FEMA attended the NRC public meetings  regarding the NRC's EP rulemaking, and co-hosted 11 of the public  meetings with the NRC held after the issuance of the proposed rule.

B. Public and Stakeholder Comments Received

    At the April 11, 2005, NREP Conference, the NRC and FEMA conducted  a workshop with stakeholders. The workshop covered a broad range of EP  topics. Unanswered stakeholder comments and questions were recorded by  NRC staff, and the NRC and FEMA responded to those questions and  comments in ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items.''     The NRC conducted a public meeting on August 31-September 1, 2005,  to obtain input regarding EP requirements and guidance for commercial  nuclear power plants. The first day of meetings involved a roundtable  discussion of topics related to the review of EP regulations and  guidance. During the second day, the NRC staff and stakeholders  addressed the ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items'' from the April  2005 NREP conference and other stakeholder comments and questions. The  NRC requested comments in writing before the August 31-September 1,  2005, meeting and also received comments at the meeting. In addition to  comments transcribed from the 2-day public meeting, the NRC accepted  written comment submissions until October 31, 2005.     The NRC and FEMA responded to generic comments from the August 31- September 1, 2005, meeting and comments received thereafter in  ``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and  October 31, 2005).'' Site-specific comments from the public meeting  were addressed in ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments  (Received Between August 31 and October 31, 2005).''     The NRC also received comments on the review of the EP regulations  and guidance for nuclear power plants at public meetings with  stakeholders on May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The May 19, 2006,  meeting was transcribed. The NRC staff informed the meeting  participants that their comments would be presented to the Commission  in a September 2006 SECY paper. These comments were provided to the  Commission in an attachment to SECY-06-0200 and, like the stakeholder  comments from 2005, were used to inform the staff's recommendations to  the Commission in SECY-06-0200.     The NRC received three comment letters that focused on the draft  preliminary rule language posted for comment on http://www.regulations.gov on February 29, 2008. One comment letter was  submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, one was submitted by  NEI, and one was submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists on  behalf of several NGOs. These comments were addressed as part of the  development of the proposed rule.     The proposed rule was published on May 18, 2009, and the public  comment period closed on October 19, 2009. The NRC received a total of  94 submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were  identified. Some of the comments and the NRC's responses are discussed  throughout this document. A detailed discussion of the public comments  and the NRC's responses is contained in a separate document (see  Section IX of this document). The NRC also received comments on issues  that are outside the scope of this rule and on regulatory provisions  that are not being revised in this rule. The NRC determined that these  comments did not support changing the scope of the final rule.

C. Proposed Rule Specific Request for Comments

    In the proposed rule, the NRC requested comments on whether the NRC  should issue regulations requiring that licensees train responders on  and implement the Incident Command System (ICS) to improve the  interface with OROs during an event at a nuclear power plant. Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) requires all Federal  departments and agencies to adopt the National Incident Management  System (NIMS) and use it in their individual incident management  programs and activities, as well as in support of all emergency  response actions taken to assist State, Tribal, and local governments.  Although NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles,  terminology, and organizational processes that enables incident  management, it also utilizes the ICS for command, operations, planning,  logistics, and finance/administration functions to manage domestic  incidents.

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    The NIMS/ICS are also widely used by State, tribal, and local  governments, including when these entities are engaged in emergency  response activities with nuclear power reactor licensees. However,  licensees are not currently required to adopt NIMS/ICS, so the  potential exists for confusion or miscommunication between OROs who  utilize NIMS/ICS as an incident management system and the associated  power reactor licensees who do not use the same system. The NRC  observed some of these coordination challenges during the nuclear power  industry's voluntary three year EP hostile action drill program  initiative, which was conducted in response to BL-05-02 and concluded  in December 2009. Ideally, both OROs and licensees should use the same  or a compatible incident management system to effectively communicate  with each other and improve their individual and joint response  capabilities.     Nevertheless, the NRC recognizes that HSPD-5 does not require the  private sector to adopt NIMS/ICS. The NRC also understands that  requiring its nuclear power reactor licensees to implement NIMS/ICS  would impose upon licensees a specific type of incident command  structure stipulated by HSPD-5. Any future changes to HSPD-5 or NIMS/ ICS could require corresponding rulemaking changes by the NRC.  Moreover, if the NRC were to compel its nuclear power reactor licensees  to use a specific incident management program, that program still could  be different than incident management systems adopted by OROs that  comply with laws promulgated by other governmental organizations. Thus,  despite the NRC's efforts to promote consistency, these potentially  conflicting regulatory authorities could prove to be incompatible  during ICS activities at the reactor sites. For example, the incident  commander during the onset of a hostile action incident at a nuclear  facility will most likely be a local law enforcement officer, whose  authority derives from the local or State jurisdiction and not from the  NRC.     Section 50.47(b)(6) of the NRC's regulations states that  ``Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response  organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.'' In this final  rule, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to  require licensees to include in their emergency plans the  ``[i]dentification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State,  local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with  emergencies, including hostile action at the site.'' Together, these  regulations require licensees to know which OROs would respond during  an emergency and how to communicate with those OROs. A licensee's use  of a command structure that is compatible with the applicable OROs'  command structure (e.g., NIMS/ICS) would enhance communication and  coordination between OROs and licensees and facilitate the licensee's  compliance with the Sec.  50.47(b)(6) standard and the requirements of  Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. The NRC's regulations, as amended by this  final rule, contain adequate requirements to ensure that licensee  compliance with these regulations would result in effective  communication between OROs and licensees during emergencies. Therefore,  the NRC is not requiring that NIMS/ICS become the sole means of  incident command management for licensees.     Comments received by the NRC in response to other specific requests  for comments in the proposed rule are addressed in Sections II and IV  of this document.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

    The Commission is amending portions of Sec.  50.47, ``Emergency  plans;'' Sec.  50.54, ``Conditions of licenses;'' Part 50, Appendix E,  ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization  Facilities;'' and Sec.  52.79, ``Contents of applications; technical  information in final safety analysis report.''

1. Section 50.47 Emergency Plans

    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(b)(3) to remove the reference to  the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria  in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a  nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for  EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional  requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a  certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed  in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion  of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)     The final rule amends Sec.  50.47(b)(10) to require licensees to  review and update their ETEs periodically. Changes to Appendix E to  Part 50 provide the required frequency and details of the ETE updates  and submissions to the NRC. Although requirements for ETEs are found in  both Sec.  50.47(b) and in Appendix E to Part 50, the level of detail  between them differs. Section 50.47(b) establishes the EP planning  standards that licensees must meet, whereas Appendix E sets forth more  detailed implementation requirements. (A discussion of this issue is  also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)     This new requirement ensures that ETEs are reviewed periodically to  determine whether population changes have caused significant changes in  the ETE values. The NRC review of ETE updates will ensure they are  performed routinely, are consistent across the industry, and are  technically sound. The NRC guidance will provide more details of NRC  expectations for development of an adequate ETE analysis, as well as  provide NRC reviewers with guidance on the review of ETE updates. The  NRC expects that the updated ETEs will be shared with OROs to be  incorporated into offsite protective action strategies.     The NRC received several comments that suggested that the proposed  rule language of Sec.  50.47(b)(10) be revised to accommodate changes  to ETE update criteria. Two commenters stated that the threshold for  ETE updates should be based on a population sensitivity study that  would assess the effect of a population change on the ETE. Two  commenters argued that the ETE updates should be based on changes in  population density rather than absolute population change. The NRC  agrees that the ETE update criteria should be changed and should be  based on the impact that a population change has on the ETE instead of  a percent change in population. However, the details of the revised ETE  update criteria should be included in Appendix E to Part 50 where more  detailed implementation requirements are found. Two commenters argued  that the proposed rule language should be revised to eliminate the  requirement for submission of ETEs to the NRC for review and approval.  The NRC believes that NRC review is necessary for consistent  implementation, but the NRC will not approve the ETE updates. See the  discussion under Appendix E to Part 50 in this section of the document  for further information on this topic.     The NRC is amending Sec.  50.47(d)(1) to remove the reference to  the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides criteria  in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance from a  nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for  EOFs, specifying that these facilities will need to meet certain  functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located  within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is  discussed in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A

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discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this  document.)

2. Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses

    The NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(q) in its entirety. Section  50.54(q)(1) defines four terms whose meanings are limited to  application within Sec.  50.54(q) in the final rule. Section  50.54(q)(1)(i) defines a ``change'' to the emergency plan as an action  that results in modification or addition to, or removal from, the  licensee's emergency plan. All such changes are subject to Sec.   50.54(q) unless another regulatory change process is controlling. For  example, a plant configuration change that removes a piece of equipment  identified and relied upon in the emergency plan could also be subject  to the requirements of Sec.  50.59 and a technical specification change  may also be involved.     In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(i) defined what would have  constituted a change to the emergency plan. The NRC received comments  that asked the NRC to remove the phrase ``resources, capabilities, and  methods identified in the plan'' from the final rule language for this  definition. The NRC agrees with these comments and made this change to  the final rule to place emphasis on the content of the emergency plan.  Although resources, capabilities, and methods are identified in the  emergency plan, not all of these will necessarily be under the control  of the licensee. For example, the licensee's emergency plan may  identify the plans and capabilities of OROs. A change to an ORO plan is  not subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process, but the modifications  to the licensee's emergency plan to reflect that change are subject to  the Sec.  50.54(q) change process.     The Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(ii) definition of ``Emergency plan'' in the  final rule encompasses any document that describes the programmatic  methods that the licensee uses to maintain preparedness and to respond  to emergencies, and to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of  Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of  Sec.  50.47(b). In response to a stakeholder comment on Sec.   50.54(q)(1)(ii) in the proposed rule, the NRC has revised this  definition in the final rule by removing the proposed reference to  ``emergency planning functions,'' and replacing it with ``methods for  maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies.''  Sub-tier documents, such as emergency plan implementing procedures, are  not ordinarily subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process because  these procedures generally only provide instructions in performing the  programmatic methods identified and described in the emergency plan.  However, if a licensee were to relocate a programmatic description to  another document, that description will remain subject to the Sec.   50.54(q) change process. For example, if a licensee were to relocate  the details of its emergency classification scheme from the emergency  plan to a wall chart posted in the control room, the wall chart would  be subject to the Sec.  50.54(q) change process. The definition also  emphasizes, by incorporation, the role of the licensee's original  emergency plan approved by the NRC in minimizing the likelihood that a  series of incremental changes, many of which may not have been reviewed  by the NRC, over time will constitute a reduction in effectiveness of  the NRC approved emergency plan.     Section 50.54(q)(1)(iii) in the final rule defines the term  ``emergency planning function'' in terms of a capability or resource  necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency.  During the development of the EP Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP  subject matter experts, including NRC staff and nuclear power industry  stakeholders, with input from the public, developed a series of  planning standard functions that are used in determining the  significance of inspection findings. These planning standard functions  are paraphrases of the broadly-worded Sec.  50.47(b) planning standards  and the corresponding requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 in terms of  the significant functions that need to be accomplished, or the  capabilities that need to be in place, to maintain the effectiveness of  a licensee's emergency plan and emergency response capability. Within  the EP Cornerstone, the significance of inspection findings depends on  whether the planning standards can be accomplished (i.e., loss of  planning standard function) or can be accomplished only in a degraded  manner (i.e., degraded planning standard function). The  characterization of a reduction in effectiveness in the final rule  capitalizes on this earlier effort in that any degradation or loss of a  planning standard function is deemed to constitute a reduction in  effectiveness. The NRC is using the phrase ``emergency planning  function'' in lieu of ``planning standard function'' as used in the ROP  to allow the definition to be applicable to licensed facilities that  are subject to Appendix E, but are not subject to the planning  standards of Sec.  50.47(b). The emergency planning functions have been  established in RG 1.219 along with examples of typical emergency plan  changes that are expected to constitute a reduction in effectiveness  and examples of changes that are not.     The emergency planning functions do not replace or supplement the  regulations upon which they were based and, as such, compliance with  these functions is not required. They are only used to differentiate  between changes that the licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC  approval and those that require prior NRC approval. The NRC did not  establish these emergency planning functions in regulations because the  underlying regulations already exist, and the expression of the  emergency planning functions differs between nuclear power reactors,  non-power reactors, and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 or Part  52. The RG 1.219 discusses these emergency planning functions for  nuclear power reactor licensees.     In response to the definition of ``emergency planning function'' in  proposed Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iii), the NRC received a stakeholder comment  that suggested that the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b) should be  used for determining reductions in effectiveness, in lieu of the  proposed emergency planning functions, since compliance is based on  meeting planning standards. The NRC disagrees with this comment. The  Sec.  50.54(q) change process establishes a two factor test to  establish whether the licensee has the authority to make a change  without prior NRC approval. First, the plan as modified must continue  to comply with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors,  the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). Second, the licensee must  establish that the change does not reduce the effectiveness of the  emergency plan. These are two different prerequisites. Compliance with  the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors, the planning  standards of Sec.  50.47(b), satisfies the first factor, but it doesn't  necessarily meet the second factor.     Under Sec.  50.47(a)(1)(i), an operating license will be issued  only if the NRC finds that there is reasonable assurance that adequate  protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a  radiological emergency. During the licensing process, the licensee or  the NRC may have identified planning constraints and vulnerabilities  that required the licensee to commit to site-specific capabilities and  resources beyond those identified in generic regulatory guidance as  meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and for

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nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of Sec.   50.47(b). After receiving its license, a licensee may have identified  newly developed planning or response constraints, or self-identified  weaknesses in its emergency plan, and implemented corrective actions  beyond that identified in its emergency plan. For example, an applicant  having a site with complex meteorological regimes or complex topography  may have been required to establish a more advanced emergency dose  assessment capability. Because these extensions to generic guidance  were found to be necessary to meet the broadly worded requirements in  Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning  standards of Sec.  50.47(b), a licensee seeking to relax these  requirements needs to determine that the emergency plan, as modified,  can continue to be effective. This will generally require that the  licensee establish that the considerations that made the site-specific  requirements necessary are no longer applicable to that site, or  require an alternative approach that maintains the plan's  effectiveness. Thus, simply meeting the requirements of Appendix E, and  for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), is not  necessarily sufficient to prevent a reduction in the plan's  effectiveness. For these reasons, the requirements of Appendix E, and  for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), alone  cannot be used for determining reductions in effectiveness.     Section 50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule defines the term  ``reduction in effectiveness'' as a change to the emergency plan that  results in a reduction of the licensee's capability to perform an  emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.  The phrase ``reduction in effectiveness'' is an evaluation concept that  is used in Sec.  50.54(q) to differentiate between changes that the  licensee is allowed to make without prior NRC approval and those that  require prior NRC approval. A determination that a change may result in  a reduction in effectiveness does not imply that the licensee could no  longer implement its plan and provide adequate measures for the  protection of the public. The NRC may approve a proposed emergency plan  change that the licensee determined to be a reduction in effectiveness  if the NRC can find that the emergency plan, as modified, continues to  meet the requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor  licensees, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), and continues to  provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and  will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ``Radiological  emergency'' as used in Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) in the final rule means  any condition that results in the declaration of any ECL and the  implementation of the licensee's emergency plan. A nuclear power  reactor licensee evaluating whether a particular emergency plan change  constitutes a reduction in effectiveness is expected to consider the  spectrum of accidents addressed in the planning basis described in  NUREG-0654. In making this determination, licensees of non-power  reactors and fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 must base their  evaluations on the planning bases for their respective facilities.     In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(1)(iv) defined the term  ``reduction in effectiveness.'' The NRC received a stakeholder comment  that suggested that the definition of ``reduction in effectiveness''  should establish a threshold based on a ``significant reduction''  rather than a reduction. The comment cited, as an example, the use of  ``more than a minimal increase'' in the Sec.  50.59 change process. The  NRC agrees that the Sec.  50.59 change process does incorporate the  phrase ``more than a minimal amount.'' However, this phrase is always  used in conjunction with a numerical criterion (e.g., Sec.   50.59(c)(2)(i) through (iv)). With few exceptions, the planning  standards of Sec.  50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E do not  establish numerical requirements. Other criteria in Sec.  50.59 are  related to any change (e.g., Sec.  50.59(c)(2)(v) through (vi) and  (viii)). The NRC has determined that any change that reduces the  effectiveness of the licensee's capability warrants prior NRC review;  therefore, the NRC disagrees with the comment. The licensee is  authorized to make changes without prior approval up to the point at  which effectiveness is reduced. This standard is reflected in the final  rule language.     Regulations in Parts 50 and 52 require applicants for licenses to  develop emergency plans that meet the requirements of Appendix E, and  for nuclear power reactors, Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable, during  facility licensing. A holder of a license under Part 50 or a combined  license under Part 52 after the Commission makes the finding under  Sec.  52.103(g) is required by Sec.  50.54(q)(2) in the final rule to  follow and maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan. The Sec.   50.54(q)(2) references to Appendix E and Sec.  50.47(b), as applicable,  extend the applicability of these requirements as a condition of the  facility license. The NRC expects licensees to identify conditions and  situations that could reduce the effectiveness of its emergency plan,  and to take corrective and/or compensatory actions to restore and  maintain the requisite effectiveness.     In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(2) would have required  licensees to follow and maintain the effectiveness of the emergency  plan. The NRC received a stakeholder comment that stated that requiring  a licensee to maintain an emergency plan effective under Sec.   50.54(q)(2) is inconsistent with the NRC approving a change that  reduces the effectiveness of the emergency plan as required by Sec.   50.54(q)(4). Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Sec.  50.54(q) address emergency  plan changes that are intentional on the part of the licensee, whereas  a non-compliance with Sec.  50.54(q)(2) is generally the result of a  licensee failure to follow the requirements of its emergency plan  (e.g., failure to notify OROs during an actual event) or failure to  take action to address conditions, from whatever cause, that reduce the  effectiveness of the emergency plan (e.g., an offsite fire department  identified and relied upon in the emergency plan is no longer available  to come to the site, and the licensee hasn't taken timely corrective  actions to restore the capability). The licensee's determination of a  reduction in effectiveness is used only to determine whether the  licensee has the authority to implement the change without prior NRC  approval under Sec.  50.54(q)(3) or must submit for prior NRC approval  under Sec.  50.54(q)(4). The NRC's approval of the proposed change  establishes a new standard of effectiveness for the licensee's  emergency plan. Accordingly, the NRC does not believe the final rule to  be internally inconsistent.     Section 50.54(q)(3) in the final rule grants authority to the  holder of a license to make changes to its emergency plan without prior  NRC approval only if an analysis demonstrates that the changes do not  reduce the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed,  continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for nuclear power  reactor licensees, Sec.  50.47(b). As such, Sec.  50.54(q)(3) provides  for a two factor test to establish whether the licensee has the  authority to make a change without prior NRC approval. First, the plan  as modified must continue to comply with the requirements of Appendix  E, and for power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).  Second, the licensee must establish that the change does not reduce the  effectiveness of the

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emergency plan. These are two different and independent prerequisites.  Compliance with the requirements of Appendix E, and for power reactors,  the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), addresses the first factor.  The second factor addresses whether or not the change reduces the  effectiveness of the emergency pan. A change that satisfies the first  factor may not satisfy the second factor and vice versa. Changes that  do not satisfy the first factor would require the licensee to request  an exemption from the affected requirements under Sec.  50.12. Changes  that do not satisfy the second factor would require the licensee to  request prior approval under Sec.  50.54(q)(4).     The NRC expects a licensee considering a change under this section  to perform an evaluation of the change to a level of rigor and  thoroughness consistent with the scope of the proposed change. A  licensee's analysis of the impact of a change on the effectiveness of  the plan needs to consider the accidents included in the emergency  planning basis, the licensing basis of the particular emergency plan,  and any emergency plan elements implemented to address site-specific  emergency response constraints (e.g., delay in staff augmentation  associated with a remote site, commitments to State or local  governments, existence of significant external hazards, etc.).     Section 50.54(q)(4) in the final rule defines the process by which  a licensee requests prior approval of a change to the emergency plan  that the licensee has determined constitutes a reduction in  effectiveness of the plan. The final rule retains the proposed  requirement that a licensee pursuing these changes must apply for an  amendment to its license as provided in Sec.  50.90. A proposed  emergency plan change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan  would expand the licensee's operating authority, and courts have found  that Commission actions that expand licensees' authority under their  licenses without formally amending the licenses constitute license  amendments and should be processed through the Commission's license  amendment procedures. (See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59  F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 651 F.2d 780 (DC Cir. 1980)  (per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re  Three Mile Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert.  denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating  Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315 (1996)).  Therefore, a change to a licensee's emergency plan that would expand  the licensee's operating authority should also be processed through the  Commission's license amendment procedures.     In response to Sec.  50.54(q)(4) in the proposed rule, the NRC  received several comments questioning the NRC's conclusion that  proposed changes that would reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's  emergency plan would expand the licensee's operating authority. The NRC  maintains that a reduction in the effectiveness of a licensee's  emergency plan constitutes an expansion of the licensee's operating  authority. A licensee's emergency plan is part of the licensing basis  for its nuclear power plant. The plan describes how the licensee will  comply with the NRC's requirements governing EP and emergency response.  The NRC's regulations require that the licensee have and implement an  approved emergency plan as a condition of its operating license. A  change to the emergency plan constituting a reduction in effectiveness  of that plan allows the licensee to disclaim responsibility for  performing activities and actions (or specific portions thereof)  formerly required (or prohibited) under the superseded provisions of  the licensee's approved emergency plan. It allows the licensee to  perform, without fear of NRC regulatory response (e.g., an order,  including an enforcement action), activities and actions formerly  precluded. In this situation, the licensee would have the capability to  operate its facility in a manner that was not previously authorized by  the NRC. In other words, the licensee would have operating authority  beyond what it originally had, as reflected in the approved emergency  plan without the proposed change.     The NRC notes that it is not simply that the emergency plan has  ``changed'' that leads to the conclusion that there is an expansion of  operating authority. Otherwise, any change to the emergency plan,  regardless of the effect on licensee authority to operate, would be  deemed an expansion of operating authority for which NRC approval via a  license amendment is required. Rather, the effect of the plan change  (i.e., allowing the licensee to operate in a manner with respect to  radiological health and safety that it was not allowed to do under the  superseded provision of the emergency plan) forms the essence of the  test of ``expanded'' operating authority.\2\ Thus, an emergency plan  change that would reduce the effectiveness of the plan would expand the  licensee's operating authority under its license. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Consistent with the former Sec.  50.54(q), Sec.  50.54(q) in  the final rule requires that only those emergency plan changes that  reduce the effectiveness of the plan need prior NRC approval. Those  plan changes that increase the effectiveness of the plan may expand  the licensee's operating authority but would not require prior NRC  approval. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Commission has determined that the NRC must approve  reductions in effectiveness to ensure compliance with the requirements  of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactors, the planning standards  of Sec.  50.47(b) so that the proposed changes provide reasonable  assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in  the event of a radiological emergency. This approval is more than a  ministerial, non-discretionary act. The determination of the  acceptability of the proposed reduction in effectiveness necessitates  consideration and resolution of technical and regulatory issues. In  some instances, the evaluation of the plan change may involve the  balancing of competing regulatory objectives and policies. Thus, NRC  approval of a reduction in effectiveness constitutes an exercise of  agency discretion. For these reasons, under the NRC's legal precedents,  NRC approval of an emergency plan change that would reduce the  effectiveness of the plan would grant the licensee greater operating  authority and would require a license amendment request.     Under Sec.  50.54(q)(4), in addition to satisfying the filing  requirements for a license amendment request in Sec. Sec.  50.90 and  50.91, the license amendment request must include all emergency plan  pages affected by the change, a forwarding letter identifying the  change, the reason for the change, and the basis for concluding that  the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the  requirements of Appendix E, and for nuclear power reactor licensees,  the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b). The NRC will review the  amendment application to make its no significant hazards consideration  determination and to determine if the proposed change to the emergency  plan is a reduction in effectiveness under Sec.  50.54(q). If the  proposed change does constitute a reduction in effectiveness, the NRC  may issue the amendment only if it determines that the emergency plan,  as modified, continues to meet the requirements in Appendix E, and for  nuclear power reactors, the planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b), and  that there continues to be reasonable assurance that adequate  protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a  radiological emergency.

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    Section 50.54(q)(5) in the final rule applies to all licensees  subject to Sec.  50.54(q) and requires that licensees retain a record  of all changes to the emergency plan made without prior NRC approval  for a period of three years from the date of change. This section also  requires the licensee to submit, as specified under Sec.  50.4, a  report of each such change, including a summary description of its  evaluation, within 30 days of the change being put into effect. The NRC  expects that the record of changes will fully describe each change made  and will include documentation of the evaluation that determined the  change was not a reduction in effectiveness. The NRC will use this  record of changes during inspection oversight of the licensee's  implementation of Sec.  50.54(q)(2).     In the proposed rule, Sec.  50.54(q)(5) would have required  licensees to submit a report of a change to the emergency plan made  without NRC approval, 30 days after the change was made. One commenter  requested that the 30-day period start when the ``change is  implemented'' rather than starting when the ``change is made.'' The NRC  agrees that clarification is necessary, but has decided to use the  phrase ``change is put into effect,'' because it provides a more  specific point in time. The change is put into effect when the modified  emergency plan is available for use in the emergency response  facilities. At that point, the change can affect the licensee's  response to an emergency condition, whether or not all typical  implementation activities, such as distribution of the updated  emergency plan and ERO training, have been completed.     Section 50.54(q)(6) in the final rule requires a licensee of a  nuclear power reactor to retain the emergency plan and each change for  which prior NRC approval was obtained under Sec.  50.54(q)(4) as a  record until the Commission terminates the license.     The NRC is removing paragraph (r) of Sec.  50.54. Section 50.54(r)  was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402), to  require then-existing licensees authorized to possess and/or operate a  research or test reactor facility to submit emergency plans complying  with Appendix E to Part 50 to the NRC for approval within one year or  two years, as applicable, from the effective date of the rule (November  3, 1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section  II.B.6 of this document.)     The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(1) of Sec.  50.54 to remove  language addressing a one-time requirement that has now been completed.  Section 50.54(s)(1) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980  (45 FR 55402). This provision required existing nuclear power reactor  licensees to submit to the NRC within 60 days after the effective date  of the rule (November 3, 1980), the radiological response plans of  State and local governmental entities in the U.S. that are wholly or  partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of  State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ.  (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6 of this  document.)     The NRC is removing paragraph (s)(2)(i) from Sec.  50.54. Section  50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a final rule on August 19, 1980  (45 FR 55402), as a single paragraph. The rule was amended on May 29,  1981 (46 FR 28838), resulting in Sec.  50.54(s)(2) being split into two  paragraphs, Sec. Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The rule  language in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(i) required that the licensee, State, and  local emergency plans for all operating power reactors be implemented  by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E  to Part 50. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section  II.B.6 of this document.)     The NRC is removing paragraph (u) from Sec.  50.54. Section  50.54(u) was published as a final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR  55402), to require then existing nuclear power reactor licensees to  submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet the  standards in Sec.  50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part  50 within 60 days after the effective date of the rule (November 3,  1980). (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.6  of this document.)     The NRC is revising paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of Sec.  50.54  to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA remains within DHS, the  responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power plants is with FEMA.  The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather than ``DHS'' for  clarity of communication with stakeholders.     The NRC is amending Sec.  50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the reference  to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. The final rule provides  criteria in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8, regarding EOF distance  from a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach  for EOFs, specifying that these facilities must meet certain functional  requirements rather than requiring that they be located within a  certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is discussed  in the section on changes to Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A discussion  of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.) 3. Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for  Production and Utilization Facilities     The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section I,  ``Introduction,'' to include a provision allowing an applicant for an  early site permit under Part 52 that chooses to propose either major  features of an, or a complete and integrated, emergency plan (Sec.   52.17(b)(2)), or a combined license under Part 52 (Sec.  52.79(a)(21))  whose application is docketed before December 23, 2011 to choose to  defer compliance with this rule.     If the applicant chooses to defer compliance with this rule, and  its early site permit or combined license is subsequently issued, then  the permit holder or licensee shall request to amend its early site  permit or combined license to demonstrate compliance with this rule no  later than December 31, 2013. Furthermore, an applicant that defers  compliance with this rule is expected to implement this rule under the  same schedule as it would implement EP requirements in the absence of  this rule. This means that this rule does not require any immediate  implementation actions on the part of any applicant, but rather shall  be implemented after receipt of a combined license, and under the  licensee's schedule for completing EP-related requirements (e.g.,  through completion of EP-related Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and  Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)).     The NRC intends, by allowing an applicant to defer compliance with  this rule, to avoid unnecessary delays in making a licensing decision  on an early site permit or a combined license already under  consideration by the NRC, provided:     (1) The application complies with all applicable, current (prior to  this rulemaking) EP regulations;     (2) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a  combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit or combined  license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the amended EP  regulations in this rule; and     (3) The applicant, if it becomes an early site permit holder or a  combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has  approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule.     In response to a request in the proposed rule for comments on the  potential impacts of a final rule on combined license and early site  permit application processes and schedules, the NRC received comments  that the

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NRC should not require pending combined license and early site permit  applicants to implement the final rule changes until after the NRC  issues the license or permit. In this final rule, the NRC is offering  applicants the option to defer compliance with the final rule. That  period of compliance deferral, between December 23, 2011 and December  31, 2013, was selected specifically to apply only to those applications  that have already been docketed and are nearing completion of the  safety review and subsequent hearings (as applicable) prior to a  licensing decision being made on the application. The NRC decided to  limit the duration of that deferral as stated because future applicants  and currently docketed applicants not nearing a licensing decision  would have ample time to bring their applications into compliance with  this final rule without the need to defer compliance. So that all  combined license and early site permit applicants ultimately comply  with the same regulations, an applicant whose application is docketed  before December 23, 2011 that does not receive a combined license or  early site permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined  license or early site permit application to comply with the changes in  this final rule no later than December 31, 2013.     The NRC has added a new requirement in Part 50, Appendix E, Section  I, to address the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) facility at Watts  Bar. The TVA is in possession of a current construction permit for  Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, and is treated as a current licensee  for purposes of satisfying the requirements of this rule. These  requirements reflect NRC support of a licensing review approach for  Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, that employs the current licensing  basis for Unit 1 as the reference basis for review and licensing of  Unit 2, as stated in the SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation  of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear  Plant Unit 2,'' dated July 25, 2007.     To improve clarity in the organization of the regulations, the  final rule numbers the paragraphs of Section I.     The NRC is amending paragraph H in Section II of Appendix E to  remove a reference to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are  provided in Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from  a nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for  EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain  functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located  within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is  discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8, of Appendix E. (A  discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this  document.)     The NRC is amending several paragraphs within Section IV of  Appendix E to Part 50 that apply to licensees and applicants for  licenses under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, as applicable. All  provisions of Section IV of Appendix E to Part 50 apply to applicants  for, and holders of, nuclear power reactor operating licenses under  Part 50, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site  permits under Part 52. Many of the provisions in Section IV also apply  to Part 50 non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, for purposes of  brevity, the initial reference to a ``licensee'' in each of the  remaining paragraphs in this section indicates that that particular  rule change applies to applicants for, and holders of, operating  licenses under Part 50 for nuclear power reactors and non-power  reactors, combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site  permits under Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise. The  initial reference to ``nuclear power reactor licensee'' in each of the  remaining paragraphs in this section means applicants for, and holders  of, operating licenses for nuclear power reactors under Part 50,  combined licenses under Part 52, and certain early site permits under  Part 52, unless specifically stated otherwise.     The NRC is amending the former first paragraph of Section IV by  adding language to require nuclear power reactor licensees, but not  applicants, to revise their ETEs when the U.S. Census Bureau decennial  census data is available. The final rule requires that within 365 days  of the later of the date of the availability of the most recent  decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule, and  within 365 days of the availability of subsequent decennial census  data, these licensees must revise their ETE analyses using the  decennial census data, and submit the analyses to the NRC under Sec.   50.4.     The NRC will review the ETE analyses for completeness using NUREG/ CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate  Studies,'' the NRC guidance on ETE development issued with the final  rule. The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of submitting  ETE updates for NRC review and extended the time period for ETE update  submission from 180 to 365 days after a population change triggering  the update or the release of census data. The NRC will not approve ETE  updates but will review them for completeness. For this reason the NRC  is requiring licensees to submit their ETE updates at least 180 days  before they use them to form protective action recommendations and  provide them to offsite authorities for use in developing offsite  protective action strategies. This will allow time for NRC review after  which licensees may assume that the updates are adequate and available  for use.     The NUREG/CR-7002 guidance is an acceptable template to meet the  requirements for ETE analysis development and nuclear power reactor  licensees should use this guidance, or an appropriate alternative, when  developing an ETE analysis or analysis update. The first set of 2010  census data is expected to be available in 2011. The NRC will establish  a schedule for review of the updated ETEs. After the licensee submits  the ETE analysis for NRC review, these ETEs will be known as the  licensee's ``updated'' ETEs, as opposed to the ``approved'' ETEs, which  are the ETEs approved by the NRC when it issues a license.     Thereafter, these licensees are required to annually review changes  in the population of their EPZs. To complete these reviews, licensees  will use data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which annually produces  resident population estimates and State/local government population  data, if available. These reviews must be conducted no more than 365  days apart. The licensee is required to update the ETE analysis to  reflect the impact of a population change that causes the longest ETE  value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected  Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs), or for the entire 10-mile  EPZ to change by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less from the  licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated ETE. An ERPA is defined as  a local area within the EPZ for which emergency response information is  provided; the EPZ is typically divided into ERPAs along geographic or  political boundaries. The licensee is required to submit the updated  ETE analysis to the NRC under the procedures of Sec.  50.4 within 365  days of the availability of the population data used in the update and  at least 180 days before using it to form protective action  recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental  authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required an ETE analysis  update when the population in the EPZ or most populous ERPA increased  or decreased by more than 10 percent from the

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population that formed the basis for the licensee's currently approved  ETE. Several commenters disagreed with the 10 percent population change  criterion being the triggering event that would require licensees to  update their ETEs. Suggested alternative thresholds included various  population sensitivity studies that would assess the effects of  population changes on ETE values; a 25 percent change in the ETE  baseline rather than a 10 percent change in the EPZ population; and  population changes resulting in a change to ETE values of 25 percent or  30 minutes, whichever is less.     The final rule adopts the approach of a 25 percent or 30 minute  increase in ETE values to determine when an ETE analysis update is  warranted. The NRC determined that basing ETE analysis updates on a  population change alone without consideration of its impact on the ETE  values may not have resulted in useful ETE updates. This is because a  large population change in an area where there is an established  infrastructure may have no impact on ETE values, whereas a small  population change in an area with limited infrastructure may impact the  ETE values. The proposed requirement to update an ETE analysis based on  a standard value of a 10 percent population change would have required  licensees to submit updated ETEs that may have had the same time  estimates as the original document and, therefore, would provide no  useful updated ETE information to response agencies. An approach that  considers both population change and its impact on the ETE numerical  values provides assurance that updated ETE analyses are submitted only  when the ETE values are impacted. This links the update to a population  change that has an impact on the ETE values on a site-specific basis  rather than a generic 10 percent population change that may or may not  impact these values.     Therefore, nuclear power reactor licensees (but not applicants)  will be required to provide an updated ETE analysis to the NRC within  365 days of (1) The later of the date of the availability of the most  recent decennial census data or the effective date of this final rule,  (2) the availability of subsequent decennial census data, and (3) the  availability of the population data used in the update, during the  years between decennial censuses, when a population increase within the  EPZ causes certain ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes,  whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved or updated  ETE. Licensees should perform a population sensitivity study for  various population increases (i.e., 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30  percent increases) to determine the population value that will cause  ETE values to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less.  If this threshold is reached during the decennial period between  censuses, the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the  impact of the population increase. To establish the basis for these  update criteria, the NRC considered the input of ETE subject matter  experts who considered the sensitivity of ETE analysis tools,  uncertainty of the data used in the development of ETEs, and  discussions with OROs regarding the time necessary to mobilize  resources to support an evacuation. The NRC determined that an ETE  increase of 30 minutes is the smallest time value that OROs would  consider to potentially impact a protective action decision from  shelter-in-place to evacuate or vice versa. A review of more than 30  current ETEs shows that most ETEs are longer than 4 hours. Therefore,  the 30-minute increase would likely be the overriding criterion,  although the 25-percent increase would be expected to apply primarily  to sites with shorter ETEs. Either of these criteria would constitute a  material change in ETE times and would provide an appropriate  assessment of the effect of population change on the ETE on a site- specific basis.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the licensee to  submit an ETE update within 180 days of a population change triggering  the update or the release of census data. The NRC received several  stakeholder comments in opposition to the proposed 180-day requirement,  some stating that the 180-day timeframe may be unrealistic. The NRC  agrees that 180 days to complete ETE updates could be challenging based  on the number of licensees and the limited number of commercial  contractors available to complete the updates. Therefore, the NRC is  extending the amount of time to complete ETE analysis updates from 180  to 365 days.     One commenter pointed out that ETEs only analyze the time required  to evacuate areas within the EPZ. The commenter requested that the NRC  clarify the sentence ``time required * * * for taking other protective  actions'' because the only other protective action is to shelter in  place and would not fall under the ETE. The NRC agrees with this  comment and has removed the language ``and for taking other protective  actions'' from the final rule language.     The requirement for nuclear power reactor licensees (but not  applicants) to evaluate a population change impact on the ETE during  the period between decennial censuses balances the burden on licensees  by requiring an ETE analysis update only when a population change has a  material impact on the individual ETE values. The U.S. Census Bureau  currently projects population growth at approximately one percent per  year in the U.S. However, certain areas experience much greater growth.  The population of Maricopa County, Arizona, for example, experienced  approximately 6.4 percent growth in the two year period from 2005 to  2007. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is located in Maricopa  County. St. Lucie County in Florida, where the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant  is located, experienced approximately 9.7 percent population growth in  the same period. A nuclear plant's EPZ population may not grow at the  same rate as the corresponding county(ies) population, but a review of  population growth would be appropriate, as discussed in Section II.B.4  of this document.     The updated ETEs will allow for more effective development of  public protective action strategies and review of evacuation planning.  Sites with little population change will be minimally impacted by the  requirement, while those sites with a greater rate of population change  that materially impacts ETE values will be required to perform more  frequent updates. Licensees should also identify potential enhancements  to improve evacuation times and discuss them with OROs. (A discussion  of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this document.)     The final rule also explains that a nuclear power reactor license  applicant must use the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data, as of the  date the applicant submits its application to the NRC, to conduct the  ETE analysis for its application. Once an applicant obtains a combined  license, it will need to conduct one review of any changes in the  population of its EPZ at least 365 days before the licensee's scheduled  fuel load. The licensee must use updated decennial census data if more  recent decennial census data than that used in the licensee's  application is available. If more recent decennial census data is not  available, then the licensee must use annual resident population  estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and State and local government  population data, if available. The licensee must update its ETE  analysis if a population increase within the EPZ causes certain ETE  values to increase by 25 percent or 30

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minutes, whichever is less from the licensee's currently NRC-approved  or updated ETE. If the 25-percent or 30-minute threshold is reached,  the licensee must update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of the  population increase. The licensee must perform this review and submit  the ETE update, to the extent necessary, no later than 365 days before  the scheduled fuel load. After beginning operations, the licensee will  need to comply with the final rule requirements, including the  frequency of ETE reviews and updates, like any other operating  licensee.     The NRC is revising the former first paragraph of Section IV to  change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide  consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.'' In the same  paragraph, the phrase ``onsite protective actions during hostile  action'' is being added as one of the elements for which emergency  plans must contain information needed to demonstrate compliance. These  elements correspond with the description of each part of Section IV;  the requirement for onsite protective actions during hostile action is  being added in new Section IV.I. The NRC is also clarifying that the  requirements for the submittal of emergency response plans apply to not  only applicants for nuclear power reactor operating licenses under Part  50, but also to applicants for early site permits (as applicable) and  combined licenses under Part 52. This clarification was intended for,  but inadvertently omitted from, a rulemaking to update Part 52 (72 FR  49517; August 28, 2007). To improve clarity in the organization of the  rule, the final rule separates Section IV, as amended by the final  rule, into seven paragraphs and numbers each of the paragraphs.     The final rule makes two editorial revisions to Appendix E to Part  50, Section IV.A.2. One change includes the abbreviation of emergency  response organization, ``ERO,'' in paragraph 2 of Section IV.A. The  second revision clarifies that paragraph 2.c. should read as follows:  ``Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency  coordinator * * *.''     The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to include  hostile action at the site as one of the types of emergencies that  define the State, local, and Federal agencies that nuclear power  reactor licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the  assistance licensees expect from these agencies. The former regulations  did not explicitly require the licensee to identify ORO resources for  responding to the site during hostile action. Part 50, Appendix E,  Section IV.A.7, in the final rule adds this requirement to ensure that  the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile action at  the site are identified in the licensee's emergency plan. This  requirement will be enforced through routine inspection and observation  of emergency exercises. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in  Section II.A.4 of this document.)     In the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, would  have been modified to add the following: ``Nuclear power plant  licensees shall ensure that offsite response organization resources  (e.g., local law enforcement, firefighting, medical assistance) are  available to respond to an emergency including hostile action at the  nuclear power plant site.'' The NRC received several comments asserting  that the proposed rule language would give authority to the licensee  over the OROs in order to ``ensure'' that resources would be available  to respond to hostile action. The NRC agrees with the comments that  determining the adequacy of ORO emergency plans is under the  jurisdiction of FEMA and other State and local organizations, and the  NRC did not intend to give licensees authority over OROs via this  rulemaking. The NRC is revising the final rule by deleting the second  sentence of Section IV.A.7, in the proposed rule, thereby clarifying  the intent of the final rule.     The NRC is revising Section IV.A.7 by inserting the words ``a  description of the'' immediately before ``assistance expected from,  appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies'' to make this provision  read consistently with the other paragraphs in Section IV.A.     Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, also adds the definition of  ``hostile action'' as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or  its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy  equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an  end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns,  explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver  destructive force. This definition is based on the definition of  ``hostile action'' in BL-05-02. The NRC is excluding non-power reactors  from the definition of ``hostile action'' at this time because a  regulatory basis has not been developed to support the inclusion of  non-power reactors in that definition. Further analysis and stakeholder  interactions would be needed prior to including non-power reactors in  the definition of ``hostile action.''     The NRC received a stakeholder comment via FEMA stating that a  ``hostile action,'' as defined by the NRC, does not mention cyber  attacks, which should be considered as a form of hostile action. Cyber  attacks are addressed in licensees' cyber security plans consistent  with Sec.  73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and communication  systems and networks,'' and associated guidance documents. The current  cyber security program associates cyber attacks with ``digital computer  and communication systems and networks,'' whereas the definition of  hostile action is an act by individuals using physical violence that  can potentially achieve an end to harm public health and safety. Even  though cyber attacks can be malevolent actions against NRC licensees,  its definition maintains an association with digital or analog computer  and communications systems, whereas hostile actions imply physical  attacks by individuals. Therefore, the definition of ``hostile action''  in Section IV.A.7 was not changed as a result of this comment.     The former Section IV.A.7 applied to non-power reactor licensees,  and the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final  rule. Non-power reactor licensees are still required to identify ORO  resources that would respond to an emergency and the assistance  licensees expect from these resources. However, because ``hostile  action'' is defined as ``an act directed toward a nuclear power plant  or its personnel,'' non-power reactor licensees are not required to  identify the State, local, and Federal agencies needed during hostile  action at the non-power reactor site.     The NRC is adding a new paragraph A.9 in Section IV of Appendix E  to Part 50. This new paragraph will require nuclear power reactor  licensees to perform a detailed analysis to show that on-shift  personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not  assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing  their assigned emergency plan functions when needed. In the proposed  rule, the NRC would have required licensees to ``provide'' a detailed  analysis. However, the NRC did not intend for licensees to submit the  detailed analysis for review or approval. Therefore, the wording in the  final rule was changed to require licensees to have a detailed analysis  in their emergency plans without providing it to the NRC.     The final rule does not specify, by position or function, which  responsibilities must be assigned, but allows nuclear power reactor  licensees the flexibility to determine the limit of assigned  responsibilities for effective emergency plan implementation on a site- specific basis. This allows licensees

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to take credit for new technologies that could potentially affect the  number of on-shift staff that would be needed. However, licensees need  to ensure that the duties assigned to on-shift staff are reasonable for  one person to perform and are not so burdensome as to negatively impact  emergency response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in  Section II.A.1 of this document.)     The final rule requires nuclear power reactor licensees to perform  a detailed analysis, such as a job task analysis (JTA) or a time motion  analysis, to demonstrate that on-shift personnel could implement the  plan effectively without having competing responsibilities that could  prevent them from performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The  NRC expects the analysis to identify all the tasks that must be  performed by available staff during an evolution such as response to an  emergency. These licensees need to define the events that will be used  in the detailed staffing analysis, such as postulated design basis  accidents and the DBT, for which there must be emergency planning. The  analysis must identify all tasks that must be completed for each  analyzed event, and the responders responsible for the performance of  those tasks. Licensees must then ensure that there is sufficient on- shift staff to perform all necessary tasks until augmentation staff  arrives to provide assistance. Enhancing the regulations to require  licensees to ensure that multiple responsibilities assigned to on-shift  staff will not detract from adequate emergency plan implementation will  establish a regulatory framework that more clearly codifies the NRC's  shift staffing expectations for effective emergency response.     The NRC is amending Section IV.B of Appendix E to Part 50 to add a  requirement that nuclear power reactor licensees must consider hostile  action, which may adversely affect the plant (e.g., cause personnel  harm and/or equipment damage), in their EAL schemes. It will also serve  to establish consistent EALs for hostile action among existing and  future nuclear power reactor licensees and allow the licensees to make  hostile action-related emergency declarations based on a credible  threat. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section II.A.2  of this document.)     The former Section IV.B applied to non-power reactor licensees, and  the NRC does not intend to change that requirement in this final rule.  Non-power reactor licensees are still required to have EALs to initiate  emergency response and protective actions. However, as discussed in  Section II.A.2 of this document, the NRC is addressing through guidance  the issue of hostile action EALs for non-power reactor licensees. In  addition, the definition of ``hostile action'' does not include non- power reactors. Therefore, non-power reactor licensees are not required  to consider hostile action in their EAL schemes at this time.     The final rule also makes changes to Appendix E to conform to  changes to Sec.  50.54(q), which address the issue described in Section  II.B.5 of this document. The NRC is modifying the requirement in former  paragraph (1) in Section IV.B of Appendix E to require each licensee to  obtain prior NRC approval via Sec.  50.90 if the licensee is changing  its entire EAL scheme. This provision carries forward the intent of the  former regulation to compel licensees to obtain NRC approval before  changing EAL schemes, and sets forth the correct process to request  that approval. The proposed rule would have required licensees to use  Sec.  50.4 to obtain prior NRC approval. For many of the same reasons  provided earlier in Section IV of this document in the discussion of  licensee use of the license amendment process to obtain prior NRC  approval of changes to an emergency plan that would reduce the  effectiveness of the plan under Sec.  50.54(q), the license amendment  process is the appropriate process for licensees to use to obtain prior  NRC approval of EAL scheme changes.     The Commission explained in the Statement of Considerations for the  2005 final rule concerning NRC approval of licensee changes to EALs (70  FR 3591; January 26, 2005) the importance of prior NRC approval of a  licensee's EAL scheme change:

    The Commission believes a licensee's proposal to convert from  one EAL scheme (e.g., NUREG-0654-based) to another EAL scheme (e.g.,  NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI-99-01 based) * * * is of sufficient  significance to require prior NRC review and approval. NRC review  and approval for such major changes in EAL methodology is necessary  to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that the final EAL  change will provide an acceptable level of safety.

    As previously noted, courts have found that Commission actions that  expand licensees' authority under their licenses without formally  amending the licenses constitute license amendments and should be  processed through the Commission's license amendment procedures. The  Commission has determined that a licensee's EAL scheme change requires  prior NRC approval ``to ensure that there is reasonable assurance that  the final EAL change will provide an acceptable level of safety.''  These determinations require exercises of agency discretion. The staff  must ensure that the licensee adopts each element of the generic EAL  scheme to fit its site and facility. In addition, the licensee does not  have the authority to change to a new scheme unless the NRC approves  the change in advance. Under the legal precedents, NRC staff approval  in these instances would grant the licensee authority beyond its  current operating authority, and that approval requires a license  amendment. This final rule clarifies that the process to request prior  NRC approval of EAL scheme changes is the license amendment process.     The final rule provides additional flexibility by permitting  licensees to use EAL schemes other than those listed in Section IV.B.2  of the proposed rule, provided that the licensee obtains prior NRC  approval. The final rule corrects a misstatement in the proposed rule  that the former rule required licensees to obtain prior NRC approval  via Sec.  50.4 for changes to an EAL scheme from NUREG-0654 to one  based solely on NUMARC/NESP-007 or NEI 99-01. The final rule also  removes the paragraph numbering in Section IV.B of the former rule. The  former first paragraph of Section IV.B, as amended by this final rule,  is designated as paragraph 1. As explained above, former paragraph (1)  in Section IV.B has been replaced with the provision requiring  licensees to obtain prior NRC approval, via a license amendment, for  EAL scheme changes. The final rule deletes former paragraphs (2) and  (3) of Section IV.B and replaces them with a new requirement that all  EAL changes, other than EAL scheme changes, are required to be made  under the amended Sec.  50.54(q) change process, as discussed earlier  in Section IV of this document. The final rule designates the  provisions concerning EAL scheme changes and other EAL changes as  paragraph 2. Paragraph B.2 applies to nuclear power reactor licensees  and non-power reactor licensees.     The NRC is retaining the existing language of Section IV.C of  Appendix E to Part 50, redesignating that language as paragraph C.1,  and adding new paragraph C.2. Paragraph C.1 still applies to non-power  reactor licensees, but paragraph C.2 does not, for the reasons provided  in Section II.B.2 of this document. Paragraph C.2 requires that nuclear  power reactor licensees, first, have and maintain the capability to  assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes  after the availability of indications to plant operators that an  emergency

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action level has been exceeded and, second, promptly declare the  emergency condition upon identification of the appropriate ECL. Any  given emergency condition may result in the thresholds for two or more  EALs being exceeded and licensees need to consider all applicable EALs  and base the classification decision on that EAL resulting in the  higher ECL.     In Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph C.2 of the proposed rule, the NRC  would have required that licensees and applicants had to promptly  declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following a  determination that an EAL has been exceeded. The NRC received a  stakeholder comment that suggested that the proposed language could be  interpreted as requiring declaration on the first identified EAL.  Because such an interpretation was not the NRC's intent, the NRC  reworded the proposed phrase ``following determination that an  emergency action level has been exceeded,'' in the proposed rule to  read ``following identification of the appropriate emergency  classification level,'' in the final rule to clearly articulate the  NRC's intent.     This new requirement emphasizes the NRC's expectations regarding  the timeliness of emergency declarations while retaining sufficient  operational flexibility to respond to extenuating circumstances  necessary to protect public health and safety. The NRC considers the  15-minute criterion to commence when plant instrumentation, plant  alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that correspond  to an EAL become available to any plant operator. As used here, ``plant  operator'' means any member of the plant staff, who by virtue of  training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or  reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the  licensee's emergency classification scheme. ``Plant operators'' may be,  but need not be, licensed operators or members of the ERO. ``Plant  operators'' may be located in the control room or in another emergency  facility in which emergency declarations are performed. The phrase  ``plant operators'' does not encompass plant personnel such as  chemists, radiation technicians, craft personnel, security personnel,  and others whose positions require they report, rather than assess,  abnormal conditions to the control room.     The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification,  and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration  from the first availability of a plant indication or receipt of a  report of an off-normal condition by plant operators up to and  including the declaration of the emergency. Validation or confirmation  of plant indications, or reports to the plant operators, is to be  accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment. A  small number of EAL thresholds are related to the results of analyses  (e.g., dose assessments, chemistry sampling) that are necessary to  ascertain whether or not a numerical EAL threshold has been exceeded,  rather than confirming or verifying an alarm or a received report. In  these limited cases, the 15-minute declaration period starts with the  availability of analysis results that show the threshold to be  exceeded; this is the time that the information is available.  Nonetheless, the NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to  initiate and complete these analyses with a reasonable sense of  urgency.     This 15-minute criterion ends as soon as the nuclear power reactor  licensee determines that an EAL has been exceeded and the licensee  makes the emergency declaration. The final rule requires the licensee  to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible  following the identification of the appropriate ECL. Because the NRC  requires emergency declarations to be made promptly, the final rule  states that the 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace  period in which a licensee may attempt to restore plant conditions to  avoid declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. If the EAL  threshold specifies a duration (e.g., ``fire lasting for greater than  10 minutes from detection''), the licensee is expected to assess and  classify the event concurrently with the specified condition duration.  The licensee is then required to promptly declare the emergency  condition as soon as the specified duration has been exceeded because  no further assessment is necessary to make the declaration. The  licensee is encouraged, but not required, to declare the emergency  condition once it has been determined that the condition cannot be  corrected before the specified duration is exceeded.     The final rule establishes a capability criterion, rather than an  inflexible performance criterion, to allow nuclear power reactor  licensees some degree of flexibility in addressing extenuating  circumstances that may arise during an actual emergency. For example,  an emergency declaration may need to be delayed in the interest of  performing plant operations that are urgently needed to protect public  health and safety. These delays could be found acceptable if they did  not deny State and local authorities the opportunity to implement  actions to protect the public health or safety under their emergency  plans and the cause of the delay was not reasonably within the  licensee's ability to foresee and prevent.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have established a 15-minute  criterion for the declaration of an emergency condition. The NRC  received several stakeholder comments that questioned the magnitude of  the numeric criterion. Other comments suggested a less restrictive one- hour criterion for events classified as Notification of Unusual Events  in light of the reduced consequences to the public of these events. In  developing this rule, the NRC objective was to codify the 15-minute  timeliness goal that had been the expected performance level after the  publishing of the EPPOS-2 guidance and which had been incorporated into  the ROP. The NRC believes that 15 minutes is an appropriate timeliness  capability criterion based on the following rationale. The declaration  of a General Emergency requires the nuclear power reactor licensee to  provide a recommendation for public protective actions to State and  local governments. These protective actions can be more effective in  reducing the radiological consequences of the emergency on the public  if the action is implemented in a timely manner, preferably before the  onset of a major release of radioactive materials. The steps that need  to be taken by offsite officials to consider the licensee's  recommendation and to decide upon and implement an action cannot start  until the licensee has classified and declared the emergency and  provided the appropriate recommendation. As such, time is of the  essence. The planning basis for emergency planning for nuclear power  plants provided in NUREG-0654 addresses a spectrum of accidents. The  NUREG-0654 planning basis provides that the onset of the release to the  environment following the onset of the event may range from 0.5 hours  to one day. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3, as amended by the  final rule, requires the licensee to have the capability to notify the  State and local officials within 15 minutes after declaring an  emergency and that the alert and notification system be capable of  alerting the public and initiating notification of the public within  about 15 minutes. The 15-minute timeliness expectation for emergency  declarations now being codified is consistent with these current  regulatory requirements and the EP planning basis.     Although the NRC recognizes that protective actions are not  necessary at the lower ECLs and the lower ECL events have lesser  potential

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consequences on the public, the NRC believes that a single timeliness  criterion for all four ECLs is necessary. The NRC notes that the ECL,  be it a Notification of Unusual Event or a higher ECL, cannot be known  until the classification is completed and the declaration is made. This  argues against the use of different timeliness criteria for  Notification of Unusual Events and higher ECLs because emergency events  may not proceed step-wise through the four ECLs.     Further, the actions to assess, classify, and declare an emergency,  and the resources needed to accomplish those actions (e.g.,  ``capability''), do not differ by ECL. Although there are more EAL  thresholds to consider during a Notification of Unusual Event than  there are at the higher ECLs, this is balanced by increasing demands on  the on-shift staff (i.e., to perform assessments, corrective actions,  and mitigative actions needed to address the degraded plant condition)  associated with the higher ECLs. The conditions (such as insufficient  staffing, procedures, and training) that reduce a nuclear power reactor  licensee's capability for declaring a Notification of Unusual Event  within 15 minutes have a similar effect on the licensee's capability  for declaring higher ECLs. Also, the licensee's performance in  declaring Notification of Unusual Events is a viable predictor of  licensee performance at the less frequently declared higher ECLs. These  performance deficiencies might not be identified and corrected if the  NRC were to establish one hour for declaring Notification of Unusual  Events and 15 minutes for the higher classification level emergencies.  Therefore, the NRC has decided to retain the single timeliness  criterion in the final rule for all ECLs.     The NRC is amending Section IV.D.1 of Appendix E to remove footnote  1. This footnote is unnecessary because the term ``EPZ'' is already  addressed in Section I of Appendix E. This change will also make the  numbering of footnotes sequentially consistent throughout Appendix E.     The NRC is amending Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to require that  the public alert and notification system required by this section  additionally has backup methods for both the alert and notification  functions without specifying which backup measures should be used. This  approach allows flexibility in the selection of the method best suited  for each nuclear power reactor site and also allows the use of newer  technologies or other alternative methods. The availability of backup  ANS methods enhances the public's ability to be promptly alerted of an  event at a facility and of possible protective actions. (A discussion  of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.1 of this document.)     Former Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E acknowledged that, for the  events more likely to warrant use of the alert and notification  capability, State and local officials will have substantial time  available to make a judgment regarding activation of the warning system  to alert and notify the public. Accordingly, the final rule will not  impose specific time requirements for using a backup method. The  alerting function may involve one or more methods that are already used  as a backup means at several sites, such as multiple, independent siren  activation points in conjunction with siren backup power, route  alerting, reverse call-out systems or newer technologies, such as  intelligent notification and communication systems for notifying  targeted populations. The notification function may involve the  designation of multiple EAS broadcast stations or use of weather alert  radios or newer technologies, such as advanced messaging systems. The  NRC and FEMA are providing guidance, issued contemporaneously with this  final rule, for determining the acceptability of the backup methods  based on the alerting and notification capabilities of the methods  selected, administrative provisions for implementing and maintaining  backup methods, identification of resources to implement backup  methods, and periodic demonstration of the backup methods. Guidance is  also being provided to nuclear power reactor licensees and offsite  officials regarding the need to ensure that the backup methods can  alert and notify the public in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ,  that the personnel and resources required to implement the backup  methods will be available during any type of emergency (including  hostile action), and that designated personnel know how to implement  backup methods.     The backup method of alerting and notification must be capable of  providing warning signals and instructional messages to the population  in the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ when the primary ANS is  unavailable during an emergency (i.e., the primary ANS cannot alert or  notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population).  The backup means may be designed so that it can be implemented using a  phased approach in which the populations most at risk are alerted and  notified first, followed by alerting and notification of people in less  immediately affected areas. The backup method may have the additional  capability of being employed only in the specific areas impacted when a  portion of the primary ANS, such as a single siren or sirens within a  community, fails and the extent of the affected area and population can  be determined.     The new requirement for a backup method applies to both the  alerting function and notification function of the FEMA approved ANS.  However, the NRC recognizes that some backup methods are not capable of  meeting the timeframes that are part of the primary ANS design  objectives. The intent of the final rule is not to have a duplicate  primary ANS, but to have a means of backup alerting and notification in  place so the public can be alerted in sufficient time to allow offsite  officials to consider a range of protective actions for the public to  take in the event of a severe accident with potential offsite  radiological consequences. The NRC and FEMA are providing guidance to  clarify the design objectives and other criteria for ANS backup  methods.     For nuclear power plant sites with no backup measures currently in  place, backup provisions must be identified, incorporated into the  site's ANS design, and submitted for FEMA approval as specified in  FEMA-REP-10. For nuclear power plant sites that already have provisions  for ANS backup means in FEMA approved ANS designs, licensees and  offsite officials will need to confirm that the backup methods meet the  final rule requirements and submit revised ANS designs for FEMA  approval if changes were deemed necessary. New Section IV.D.4 in  Appendix E to Part 50 sets forth the deadlines for these implementation  phases. Section V of this document provides further explanation of the  deadlines.     Additional changes to Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 are being made to  more clearly distinguish between the alerting and notification  functions of the ANS (including clarification of how the 15-minute  design objective applies to these functions), to use consistent  terminology when referring to the officials responsible for ANS  activation, and to update language regarding demonstration of ANS  capabilities and correction of deficiencies. The final rule adds a  reference to the alerting function in Section IV.D.3 to clearly  indicate that the requirements for the primary and backup ANS apply to  both the alerting and notification functions. The wording of the  primary ANS design objective is revised to clarify that the 15-minute  criterion applies to the completion of the initial alerting and start  of the initial notification of the public. This

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clarification was made because the NRC, consistent with the 1990  Seabrook decision (Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook  Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-935, 32 NRC 57, 68 (1990), has determined  that notification of the public need not be completed within 15 minutes  but that initiation of the notification process must begin within 15  minutes). The phrase ``appropriate governmental authorities'' replaces  the phrase ``State and local officials'' when referring to ANS  activation to encompass site-specific variations in the assignment of  the responsibility for this function according to each offsite  emergency plan and established ANS activation protocols. This  responsibility may be assigned to a single State or local organization,  or to multiple organizations among various State, county, local, and  other governmental agencies. The use of ``appropriate governmental  authorities'' addresses all of these variations. The former Section  IV.D.3 referred to the February 1, 1982, date for then existing nuclear  power reactor licensees to have demonstrated ANS capabilities for their  sites. The NRC is removing the reference to the February 1, 1982, date  and requiring that ANS capabilities to alert the public and provide  instructions promptly must be demonstrated before exceeding 5 percent  rated thermal power of the first reactor at each site, consistent with  the requirements of Sec.  50.47(d). It is also important that licensees  promptly correct deficiencies found during initial ANS installation and  testing, as well as deficiencies identified thereafter, as required by  Sec.  50.54(s)(2). However, the requirement for correction of ANS  deficiencies is clearly stated in Sec.  50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not  need to be repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required licensees to  identify and demonstrate that governmental authorities had the  administrative and physical means for providing a backup method of  public ANS. The NRC received several stakeholder comments that noted  that governmental authorities are generally responsible for ANS  activation and implementing any backup public ANS, and that the  licensee has no control over the resources necessary to implement the  backup capability. The NRC agrees that licensees generally secure the  support of governmental authorities to maintain reasonable assurance  that the offsite portions of the emergency plan can and will be  implemented. In response to these comments, and to improve regulatory  clarity and structure, the final rule modifies the proposed rule  language for the backup capability to reflect this division of ANS  responsibilities.     Note that no changes are being made to the basic requirement in  Sec.  50.47(b)(5) for nuclear power reactor licensees or applicants to  ensure that the means to provide early notification and clear  instruction (i.e., alerting and notification) to the populace in the  plume exposure pathway EPZ have been established. It is not necessary  to address backup methods in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) because the current  provision establishes the overall requirement for alerting and  notification.     Based on a comment received on the proposed rule, Part 50, Appendix  E, Section IV.E.5 is revised to replace the reference to ``physicians''  with the term ``medical service providers'' because licensees typically  make arrangements for medical services with medical service providers  rather than individual physicians. The phrase ``and other medical  personnel'' is deleted because it is now redundant to the reference to  ``medical service providers.'' The NRC also revised Section IV.E.5 of  Appendix E to change the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological'' to  provide consistent use of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''     The final rule redesignates the former language of Appendix E,  Section IV.E.8 as Section IV.E.8.a; and adds new Sections IV.E.8.b,  IV.E.8.c, IV.E.8.d, and IV.E.8.e.     Section IV.E.8.a in the final rule removes the reference to the EOF  as a ``near-site'' facility and adds the requirement that nuclear power  reactor licensees must provide an OSC. In a conforming change, the  final rule revises Sec.  52.79(a)(17) to clarify that combined license  applications are not subject to the TMI action requirements in Sec.   50.34(f)(2)(xxv), which address the need for an onsite TSC, an onsite  OSC, and an EOF. Instead, the requirements governing the need for such  facilities in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) will apply to  combined license applications. (A discussion of this issue is also  provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)     Section IV.E.8.b incorporates EOF distance criteria currently found  in NRC guidance and specifies that an EOF must be located within 10 to  25 miles of each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves  or, if the EOF is located less than 10 miles from a nuclear power  reactor site, then a backup facility must be provided within 10 to 25  miles of a site. The distance between the EOF and a site will be  determined by the straight line distance from the site's TSC to the  EOF, which is consistent with the approach described in NUREG-0696,  Table 2, ``Relation of EOF Location to Habitability Criteria,'' dated  February 1981. An EOF located more than 25 miles from the site must not  adversely impact the ability of licensee and offsite responders to  fulfill their responsibilities, and provisions for locating NRC and  offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site must be  made so they can interact face-to-face with personnel going to and  leaving the site for briefings and debriefings. During an event, NRC  and offsite agency staff may wish to relocate from a remotely located  EOF to another facility closer to the nuclear power plant site.  Suitable space near the site must be available so NRC and offsite  agency staff could coordinate their actions efficiently, communicate  with responders in other onsite and offsite emergency response  facilities, and interface directly with responders at the site as  needed. This space will allow NRC site team and offsite response  personnel, including Federal, State, and local responders, to conduct  briefings and debriefings with emergency response personnel entering  and leaving the site, communicate with responders at other emergency  response facilities, maintain awareness of conditions at the site, and  share information with other emergency response organizations via  electronic means, such as computer links, the internet, or facsimile  transmission.     The proposed rule language in Section IV.E.8.b of Appendix E would  have obviated the need for licensees to obtain approval at either the  NRC staff or Commission level to locate an EOF or consolidate EOFs more  than 25 miles from a site if the EOF met certain performance based  requirements and provided for NRC site team and offsite agency  responders closer to the site. However, offsite agencies and the NRC's  Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) expressed concerns  about forgoing the requirement for a licensee to obtain NRC approval to  locate an EOF beyond 25 miles. The NRC believes it is important for a  licensee or an applicant to consult with offsite agencies that send  representatives to the EOF prior to locating or consolidating such  facilities. This consultation is particularly important when a licensee  or applicant intends to use an EOF located more than 25 miles from a  site to ensure that response times to the facility would be acceptable  to offsite responders, adequate communications with offsite

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responders at other locations would be available, and the EOF location  would not raise any jurisdictional concerns (e.g., when the EOF is  located in a different State than a nuclear power plant). Therefore,  the NRC is retaining the requirement for a licensee or applicant to  obtain Commission approval to locate an EOF more than 25 miles from the  nuclear power plant site(s) it serves and modified the rule language in  Section IV.E.8.b accordingly.     A licensee will need prior Commission approval through a license  amendment to locate an EOF beyond the 25-mile limit. Similar to  approving EAL scheme changes and emergency plan changes that would  reduce the effectiveness of the plan, determining whether a licensee's  proposed EOF meets the regulatory criteria can require an exercise of  agency discretion. Approval in these instances would grant the licensee  authority beyond its current operating authority, and that approval  requires a license amendment. Consistent with previous Commission  approvals of EOFs beyond the 25-mile limit, these license amendments  must be approved by the Commission and not the NRC staff.     Section IV.E.8.c in the final rule provides performance based  criteria applicable to all EOFs. The functions that an EOF must address  include the capability to obtain and display plant data and  radiological information for each reactor unit or plant that the  facility serves. In some cases, an EOF may serve units or plants  involving more than one type of reactor technology, such as pressurized  water reactors and boiling water reactors, or more than one design of  the same reactor type. The EOF staff must be capable of understanding  conditions for each type of reactor and translating technical  information into a useful form for offsite officials and media  relations staff. A co-located or consolidated facility must also be  capable of supporting effective response to events at more than one  site simultaneously, because widespread events affecting multiple sites  can and have occurred, such as the electrical blackout in several areas  of the northeastern U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. The  ability to simultaneously display information for multiple plants will  also enhance effective response to events occurring at more than one  site.     Section IV.E.8.d in the final rule requires nuclear power reactor  licensees to identify an alternative facility (or facilities) that  would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing  hostile action, to function as staging areas for augmentation of ERO  staff during hostile action to minimize delays in emergency response  and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response. To accomplish  this, the alternative facility is required to have the following  characteristics: the capability for communication with the EOF, control  room, and plant security; the capability to notify offsite agencies;  and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including  damage control team planning and preparation. These capabilities will  ensure that the ERO is aware of conditions at the site and is prepared  to re-enter the site when it is deemed accessible. This will enable  rapid staffing of onsite emergency response facilities and  implementation of mitigation actions when ERO personnel enter the  protected area. However, alternative facilities are not required to  reproduce the full documentation present at primary emergency response  facilities.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power  plant licensees and applicants under Part 50 and Part 52 to identify an  alternative facility (or facilities) to function as staging areas for  augmentation of ERO staff during hostile action. The NRC received  several stakeholder comments that stated that the proposed rule was not  consistent with the wording of Attachment 5 to BL-05-02. One commenter  indicated that the use of the parenthetical phrase ``(or facilities)''  can be interpreted in two ways. If licensees use multiple locations to  function as the alternative facility, then this phrase could mean that  either all the locations will have the characteristics of the  alternative facility or that these locations will collectively have  those characteristics. To clarify this provision, the NRC changed the  language of the final rule to explicitly state that the alternative  facility (or facilities) must collectively have the necessary  characteristics.     The same commenter also stated that the proposed rule would require  the alternative facility to have the capability to perform offsite  notifications whereas the wording of BL-05-02 states that one of the  alternative facility characteristics is the capability to notify  offsite response organizations if the EOF is not performing this  action. The commenter argued that the final rule should have the same  wording as contained in BL-05-02. The NRC disagrees with this comment.  The intent of BL-05-02 was to provide a backup capability to perform  offsite notifications if the other licensee emergency response  facilities were not available due to a hostile action. In the event of  a hostile action, there is no guarantee that the EOF would be available  to perform this action. Therefore, the NRC has determined that the  capability to perform offsite notifications is a necessary  characteristic of alternative facilities. Licensees have the option to  use the EOF as their alternative facility if it is located outside the  owner-controlled area and is within about 30 miles of the site. If the  EOF is not the designated alternative facility, then the alternative  facility must also have the capability to perform offsite  notifications, though not necessarily with the identical equipment  utilized in other emergency response facilities.     The commenter also pointed out that the final rule should have the  same wording as BL-05-02, which states that ``it is appropriate for  alternative facilities to have general plant drawings, procedures,  phones, and (ideally) computer links to the site.'' Another commenter  recommended an increased implementation period for this part of the  rule since licensee facilities do not meet the proposed requirements  for the availability of computer links and would need to make facility  changes under the site modification process. The NRC agrees in part  with these comments. Bulletin BL-05-02 does direct licensees to equip  alternative facilities as stated. However, the NRC has determined that,  since the alternative facility (or facilities) must have the capability  to communicate with the EOF, control room, and site security, to  perform offsite notifications, and to conduct engineering assessment  activities, including damage control team planning and preparation,  licensees should have flexibility in meeting these requirements based  on site-specific characteristics. Also, the NRC did not intend for  licensees to perform major facility modifications or construct new  facilities to meet the new requirement. The NRC intends for licensees  to use existing facilities that are a safe distance from the plant.  Therefore, the NRC will not codify the equipment that must be present  in the alternative facility (or facilities) but rather will allow  licensees to achieve the required capabilities of the alternative  facility (or facilities) in the most appropriate manner for their site.     In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required the alternative  facility (or facilities) to collectively exhibit certain  characteristics, one of which was ``accessibility even if the site is  under threat of a, or during an actual, hostile action.'' The ACRS  Plant Operations and Fire Protection Subcommittee questioned whether  the NRC intended for this provision to require that if

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multiple facilities are utilized as the alternative facility, then each  of the facilities must be accessible during hostile action or the  threat thereof. Because the purpose of this provision is to require  nuclear power reactor licensees to have an alternative facility (or  facilities), each of which would be accessible under the threat of a,  or during an actual, hostile action, the NRC changed the language of  the final rule to clarify this characteristic of the alternative  facility (or facilities). (A discussion of this issue is also provided  in Section II.A.3 of this document.)     The NRC is also adding new Section IV.E.8.e to permit a nuclear  power reactor licensee that, on the day the final rule becomes  effective, has an existing approved EOF that does not meet the distance  criteria for a primary or backup EOF, or does not have provisions for a  facility closer to the site if the EOF is located more than 25 miles  from a nuclear power reactor site, to not be subject to the  requirements of Section IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already received  approval from the Commission for variances from existing requirements  (and guidance) regarding EOF locations, backup EOF facilities, or other  EOF characteristics. The rule language was revised in the final rule to  clarify that exceptions to the requirements of Section IV.E.8.b apply  only to existing EOFs. If a licensee relocates its EOF or consolidates  EOFs after the effective date of the final rule, then the requirements  of this section will apply to the relocated or consolidated facility.  (Also refer to the discussion of this issue in Section II.B.3 of this  document.)     The NRC is amending Sections IV.E.9.c and IV.E.9.d to remove  references to the EOF as a ``near-site'' facility. Criteria are  provided in Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E, regarding EOF distance from a  nuclear power reactor site and for a performance based approach for  EOFs. The criteria specify that these facilities need to meet certain  functional requirements rather than requiring that they be located  within a certain distance of the plant. The intent of this change is  discussed in the changes to Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E. (A discussion  of this issue is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this document.)     The NRC is revising paragraph F.1.a of Section IV to remove the  word ``radiation'' because the advent of hostile action scenarios  renders usage of the word as too limiting in describing potential  emergencies. This change provides consistent use of the term  ``emergency plan.'' The NRC is also revising paragraph F.1.b to change  the term ``radiation'' to ``radiological,'' to provide consistent use  of the phrase ``radiological emergency.''     The final rule revises Section IV.F.2 to replace ``public  notification system'' with ``public alert and notification system.'' In  the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2 referred to the ANS as the ``public  notification system'' and other sections of the rule referred to the  ANS as the ``public alert and notification system.'' The NRC received a  comment identifying this inconsistency. ``Public notification system''  has been changed in the final rule to the ``public alert and  notification system'' for clarity and consistency with the usage  elsewhere.     The NRC is adding a new requirement to Section IV.F.2.a to require  nuclear power reactor licensees to submit, for NRC review and  verification, scenarios for full participation exercises required by  Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. This requirement enables the NRC to  ensure that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the new  requirements of Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j of Appendix E, including  hostile action and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of  responders.     The NRC is revising paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and F.2.a.(iii) of  Appendix E, Section IV to replace ``DHS'' with ``FEMA.'' Although FEMA  remains within DHS, the responsibility for offsite EP for nuclear power  plants is with FEMA. The FEMA requested that ``FEMA'' be used rather  than ``DHS'' for clarity of communication with stakeholders. In  addition, in the first sentence of paragraph F.2.a.(iii), the NRC is  changing the word ``licensee'' to ``license'' to correct a  typographical error.     The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.b to require nuclear power  reactor licensees to submit scenarios for their onsite biennial  exercises under 10 CFR 50.4. This requirement enables the NRC to verify  that licensees implement in their exercise scenarios the requirements  of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i and IV.F.2.j, including hostile action  and a variety of challenges to reduce preconditioning of responders.  The NRC received comments regarding the timeliness of scenario reviews  and has included language in the rule to specify that licensees must  submit scenarios to the NRC at least 60 days before the start of the  biennial exercise. The NRC will not approve scenarios, but will comment  if concerns are noted. The NRC will provide any comments to the  licensee no later than 30 days before the exercise begins. The NRC is  also inserting the word ``subsequent'' in paragraph F.2.b of Section IV  to distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b.  The NRC is also adding wording in paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b to  distinguish between the requirements of paragraphs F.2.a and F.2.b  regarding the type of exercises for which scenarios are to be  submitted. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in Section  II.A.6 of this document.)     The former Section IV.F.2.b required that licensees ensure that  adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained to address  several principal emergency response functional areas. The NRC is  expanding the list of principal functional areas of emergency response  in paragraph F.2.b to include event classification, notification of  offsite authorities, assessment of the impact of onsite and offsite  radiological releases, and development of protective action  recommendations. These additional functional areas are associated with  the planning standards in Sec.  50.47(b) that have a significant impact  on determining the licensee's ability to implement adequate measures to  protect public health and safety during a radiological emergency (i.e.,  Sec.  50.47(b)(4) regarding event classification, Sec.  50.47(b)(5)  regarding notification of offsite authorities, Sec.  50.47(b)(9)  regarding assessment of radiological releases, and Sec.  50.47(b)(10)  regarding protective actions).     Additionally, the NRC is clarifying the intent of the principal  functional areas by replacing the term ``corrective actions'' with the  term ``mitigative action implementation'' in Section IV.F.2.b. The term  ``corrective actions'' is generally associated with a process (e.g.,  the Corrective Action Program) to address identified plant problems.  However, this process is not normally used during the active response  to an emergency. ``Mitigative action implementation'' is a more  accurate description of the principal functional area that is to be  demonstrated in exercises and drills. This term is not the same as  ``plant system repair,'' another principal functional area, because  ``mitigative action implementation'' may involve equipment, procedures,  and strategies developed under Sec.  50.54(hh), the use of fire truck  pumping capacity to inject water, or some ad hoc action. ``Mitigative  action implementation'' communicates the expectation for a much more  rapid response process than is communicated by ``corrective actions''  as that term is commonly used within the commercial nuclear power  industry.     The NRC is amending the last sentence of Section IV.F.2.b to add  ``in all participating facilities'' after ``operating staff'' to  clarify that the operating staff from all facilities need not  participate in the drill. The NRC is

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also changing ``the drills could focus on onsite training objectives''  to ``the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives''  to make the permissive intent of the regulatory language more explicit.     The NRC is amending the third sentence of Section IV.F.2.c by  correcting grammar without changing the substance or intent of the  provision. The word ``and'' is being removed from the end of Section  IV.F.2.c.(1) and (2), and a semicolon replaces the period at the end of  Section IV.F.2.c.(3), for the same reason. The NRC is also adding  Section IV.F.2.c.(4) and (5) to clarify requirements for nuclear power  reactor licensees at co-located sites to conduct hostile action  exercises. The NRC received a comment regarding this issue and modified  the proposed rule to direct that hostile action exercises be rotated  between the licensees. This change flows logically from the new  requirement to conduct hostile action exercises. Specific provisions  for the conduct of exercises at co-located sites have been previously  promulgated to clarify requirements for ORO participation (70 FR 3591).  This action was appropriate because the same OROs support the emergency  plans of both licensees at a co-located site. This final rule in  Section IV.F.2.c.(5) requires that licensees at a co-located site  rotate participation with OROs in hostile action exercises in a manner  similar to other exercise participation to ensure that all licensees  participate with OROs on a periodic basis. However, Section  IV.F.2.c.(4) requires that licensees not participating with OROs  conduct at least the onsite portion of hostile action exercises in each  exercise cycle in order to ensure the maintenance of key skills.     The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.d to reflect exercise cycle  requirements for States with respect to ingestion pathway and hostile  action exercises. The proposed rule included a case-by-case assessment  for scheduling of hostile action exercises in States with multiple  nuclear power reactors. However, in public meetings stakeholders  commented that case-by-case assessments would create regulatory  uncertainty. The final rule addresses exercises in States with multiple  nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZs by providing that  States should periodically participate in full or partial participation  hostile action exercises and should rotate State participation among  the licensees.     Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d of the former rule provided  that States should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion  of exercises at least once every six years. As explained below  regarding changes to Section IV.F.2.j, the NRC is requiring exercise  cycles to be eight years long. A logical extension of establishing an  eight-year exercise cycle is to eliminate the minimum frequency element  in Section IV.F.2.d and state that States should fully participate in  the ingestion pathway portion of exercises every cycle.     The NRC is amending Section IV.F.2.f to add a second situation when  remedial exercises are required. The final rule explains that remedial  exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily  tested during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC, in consultation  with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective  measures can be taken in response to an emergency or determine that key  ERO skills had been maintained. This change demonstrates the NRC's  intent to invoke this requirement for exercises where the scope of the  exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate the maintenance of key ERO  skills. In the past, some exercises have not provided such a  demonstration due to the use of simplistic scenarios. The final rule  change is intended to prevent this trend in the future.     The key skills necessary to implement the emergency plan vary among  ERO members, emergency response facilities, and licensees. In general,  key skills include the ability to implement emergency response  procedures specific to the duties of the ERO member. Key skills include  specific response capabilities that may be assigned in a site-specific  manner such as:      Timely classification of events;      Timely notification of offsite authorities;      Assessment of radiological releases onsite and offsite;      Development of protective action recommendations;      Dissemination of information to the public via media  channels;      Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and  repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions;      Mitigative action implementation;      Protection of workers during emergency response, including  medical care;      Response to operational transients while implementing the  emergency plan; and      Coordination with offsite response organizations.     In the proposed rule, the NRC provided a list of key skills  licensees' emergency responders would have needed to implement  emergency response procedures. The NRC received a comment that argued  that the list of skills needs to be more specific. The NRC does not  agree with this comment because the skills listed are more specific  than previous requirements, are elaborated upon in guidance, and in  some cases have been defined through the EP performance indicator  program, as described in NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance  Indicator Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009.     The NRC is also revising Section IV.F.2.g to require licensees to  correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified during exercises,  drills, or training. This change explicitly states the regulatory  intent that licensees must formally critique performance opportunities  that develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills in exercises, drills,  and training, and correct any weaknesses or deficiencies identified in  a critique. The term ``performance opportunity'' is used to indicate  actual experiential events where proficiency in key skills is  demonstrated. Classroom training may not provide an actual performance  enhancing experience but rather offer instruction, while tabletop  drills and operator requalification drills may offer actual performance  opportunities.     The NRC is revising Section IV.F.2.h in the final rule to correct  the reference to the section of Part 50 that pertains to situations in  which State and local governments refuse to participate in emergency  planning activities. The reference was changed to Sec.  50.47(c)(1).     The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.i to Appendix E to require all  nuclear power reactor licensees to include hostile action in biennial  evaluated exercises. The final rule also ensures that scenarios will be  sufficiently varied by requiring the use of a wide spectrum of  radiological releases and events, to properly train responders to  respond to events more realistic than those currently used in training,  and to avoid preconditioning the responders to success with  inappropriate anticipatory responses. Licensees are also required to  emphasize coordination in their drills and exercises among onsite and  offsite response organizations to strengthen the capabilities of the  OROs to adequately respond to an emergency at the plant that requires  offsite response. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in  Section II.A.6 of this document.)     The NRC is adding new Section IV.F.2.j to Appendix E to require  that nuclear power reactor licensees conduct exercises that provide ERO  members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills  necessary to implement the principal emergency response

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functional areas identified in Section IV.F.2.b. Each exercise will  also be required to provide ERO members the opportunity to demonstrate  key skills specific to the emergency response duties in each emergency  response facility. During each exercise cycle, licensees will be  required to vary the content of exercise scenarios to provide ERO  members the opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills  necessary to respond to several specific scenario elements, including  hostile action directed at the plant site; no radiological release or  an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public  protective actions; an initial classification of or rapid escalation to  a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency; implementation of  strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.   50.54(hh)(2); and integration of offsite resources with onsite  response. The final rule identifies the exercise cycle as eight  calendar years, which must begin in the year of the licensee's first  hostile action exercise. This amendment prescribes the minimum exercise  scenario elements necessary for licensees to meet NRC expectations for  challenging and varied scenario content in biennial exercises.     The NRC received comments regarding the proposed requirement that  the first exercise in the new cycle must include hostile action. In  States with multiple nuclear power reactor sites, this would require  several such exercises in succession, increasing the burden on State  emergency management agencies to support these exercises and perhaps  reducing the benefit of preparedness efforts. The implementation period  for this provision of the final rule was modified to allow current  licensees until December 31, 2015, to conduct a hostile action  exercise. The final rule clarifies the expectation that States should  fully participate in a hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015,  and that State full participation should be rotated among licensees in  States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway  EPZ.     The NRC believes that, in the current threat environment, nuclear  power reactors may be a target for hostile action. Although such an  attack is unlikely, EP is a defense-in-depth measure and NRC rules  require preparedness for unlikely accidents and events. The final rule  requires that hostile action response be integrated formally into the  EP program through the inspection of biennial exercises performed early  in the first exercise cycle and periodically thereafter.     The proposed rule would have identified the exercise cycle as six  years. The proposed rule additionally would have specified a minimum  frequency for hostile action scenarios. However, the NRC received  numerous comments that the cycle should be changed to eight years and  that a minimum frequency for hostile action scenarios should be  eliminated to allow more flexibility in meeting the new requirements as  well as preserving the variability of scenario challenges.  Additionally, the commenters stated that the new requirements for  scenario content coupled with the existing requirements would degrade  the ability to vary scenario content. The NRC agrees with these  comments and has changed the proposed rule to establish an eight-year  exercise cycle without a minimum frequency for hostile action  scenarios. This change enhances the ability of licensees to vary  exercise scenario content in line with the numerous comments received  on this issue.     Section IV.F.2.j in the final rule requires that nuclear power  reactor licensees maintain a record of exercises that documents the  contents of scenario elements used for each exercise during an exercise  cycle to comply with the requirements of paragraph F.2.j. The  documentation should include, but not be limited to, the following  items for each scenario: sequence and timeline of events; extent of ERO  participation and objectives to be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO  demonstration of classification, notification, and development of  protective action recommendations; expected radiological release  conditions and demonstration of dose assessment, including dose  projection results; and expected onsite/offsite radiological survey  activities and results.     In the proposed rule, Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec.  50.54(hh)  in the scenario elements for the exercise cycle. The NRC received one  comment that suggested that the NRC delete the reference to Sec.   50.54(hh) in Section IV.F.2.j and that hostile action drills be  evaluated and incorporated into the NRC's triennial FOF drills. The NRC  does not agree with this comment. The NRC added the use of mitigation  equipment and procedures required by Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) and response to  hostile action in the final rule because they are important elements of  nuclear plant defense-in-depth. Including the use of Sec.  50.54(hh)(2)  equipment in FOF drills would be inappropriate because the ERO, not  security responders, would use the equipment. Additionally, the NRC has  previously determined that combining EP and FOF drills would be  extremely complicated due to differences in scope of the two evolutions  and the introduction of safeguards information issues. Further, the  exercises are easily separated and performance addressed individually  because the response is essentially serial. The aftermath of a security  response can be simulated effectively in EP exercises. This has been  demonstrated during the hostile action drill pilot program.     The NRC received a comment that proposed Section IV.F.2.j could be  interpreted as requiring an aircraft response in every hostile action  exercise because proposed Section IV.F.2.j referenced Sec.  50.54(hh).  Section 50.54(hh)(1) requires certain actions to be taken in response  to an aircraft threat. Section 50.54(hh)(2) requires the development of  strategies, procedures, and guidance for response to loss of large  areas of the plant due to fire or explosion. The NRC intended to  require the demonstration of strategies, procedures, and guidance  developed under Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) as these elements could be used in  response to many accident scenarios, as well as in the aftermath of  hostile action, increasing the variability of scenarios. Implementation  guidance accompanying this final rule recommends that licensees  demonstrate their response to an aircraft threat under Sec.   50.54(hh)(1) during an exercise cycle, but not necessarily during a  biennial exercise. Section IV.F.2.j was clarified to require  demonstration of Sec.  50.54(hh)(2) capabilities in a biennial exercise  during each exercise cycle.     The NRC is adding new Section IV.I to Appendix E that requires  nuclear power reactor licensees to provide an expanded range of  protective measures for onsite personnel that are appropriate for  protection against hostile action. These measures will be site-specific  and consider issues such as the location of workers in relation to  potential targets, which will dictate if sheltering and/or evacuation  are appropriate to adequately protect the workers. Also, these measures  are prudent to protect personnel necessary to safely shut down the  reactor and emergency responders who are necessary to implement the  licensee's emergency plan. By specifying these measures for personnel  designated to carry out site emergency actions, other onsite workers  will also be protected because the onsite protective measures that were  deemed appropriate to protect against hostile action would be provided  via plant page announcements or at the direction of site security  personnel to the site as a whole and would not be directed to any

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particular group of workers. The new requirement does not direct any  specific actions, but will allow licensees flexibility to determine the  most effective protective measures for onsite personnel protection on a  site-specific basis. It also will allow licensees to take advantage of  new technologies or other innovations that can further enhance the  protection of workers. (A discussion of this issue is also provided in  Section II.A.5 of this document.)

V. Implementation

    This final rule becomes effective December 23, 2011. Licensees will  be permitted to defer implementation of the final rule until June 20,  2012, except for the following rule changes:     (1) The new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q) (amended emergency  plan change process). Submittal of proposed emergency plan changes for  prior NRC approval made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the  new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q)(4). Submittal of emergency plan  change documentation made after February 21, 2012 must conform with the  new requirements under Sec.  50.54(q)(5). The implementation period for  these requirements was revised from 30 days after publication of the  final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 90 days  after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register based on  comments that 30 days after publication may not be sufficient time for  licensees to update their site programs and procedures to address the  amended emergency plan change process requirements. The NRC believes  that a 90-day time frame after publication is reasonable for this  activity, and the final rule reflects this adjustment to the  implementation schedule;     (2) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1-7  (evacuation time estimate updates), which each applicable licensee is  required to implement within 365 days of the later of the date of  availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S.  Census Bureau or December 23, 2011;     (3) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7  (licensee coordination with OROs), which each applicable licensee is  required to implement no later than June 23, 2014. The implementation  period for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication  of the final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 30  months after the effective date of the final rule based on comments  that 180 days may not be sufficient time to obtain new or update  existing arrangements involving offsite resources that support onsite  and offsite response activities. The NRC believes that a 30-month time  frame is more reasonable for this activity, and the final rule reflects  this adjustment to the implementation schedule;     (4) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9  (on-shift staffing analysis), which each applicable licensee must  implement no later than December 24, 2012. The implementation period  for this requirement was revised from 180 days after publication of the  final rule in the Federal Register in the proposed rule to 365 days  after the effective date of the final rule based on comments that 180  days may not be sufficient time to perform the on-shift staffing  analysis. However, licensees are expected to take interim compensatory  measures to address any staffing shortfalls identified in the staffing  analysis within 30 days of when the results of the staffing analysis  are available, and then implement long-term corrective actions within  24 months of performing the staffing analysis;     (5) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3  (backup means for alert and notification systems). Where FEMA has  approved a nuclear power reactor site ANS design report including the  backup ANS capability, this rule provision must be implemented by  December 24, 2012. Where the ANS design report does not include backup  ANS means or is in need of revision to ensure adequate backup ANS  capability, a revision of the ANS design report must be submitted to  FEMA for review by June 24, 2013 and the FEMA-approved backup ANS means  must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval. However, the  total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup ANS means shall  not exceed June 22, 2015;     (6) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section  IV.E.8.d (emergency response organization augmentation at alternative  facility), which each applicable licensee is required to implement no  later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the capability for  staging emergency response organization personnel at an alternative  facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications with the  EOF, control room, and plant security, which must be implemented no  later than June 20, 2012; and     (7) The new requirements under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2  (challenging drills and exercises). Each applicable licensee is  required to conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no  later than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a  site will begin in the calendar year of the first hostile action  exercise. For a site licensed under Part 52, the first eight-year  exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial exercise  required by Section IV.F.2.a. All of the new requirements in Section  IV.F.2 that must be completed in an exercise cycle must be implemented  no later than the first eight-year exercise cycle for each site. The  remaining new requirements in Section IV.F.2 are effective on December  23, 2011.     Certain applicants for an early site permit under Part 52, or a  combined license under Part 52, can defer compliance with this final  rule. Such an applicant can defer compliance if its application  complies with all applicable, current (prior to this rulemaking) EP  regulations, and the applicant, if it becomes an early site permit  holder or a combined licensee, requests to amend its early site permit  or combined license before December 31, 2013, to comply with the  amended EP regulations in this final rule. The applicant, if it becomes  a combined licensee, may not operate the facility until the NRC has  approved the license amendment demonstrating compliance with this rule.  If the applicant does not receive a combined license or early site  permit before December 31, 2013, the applicant shall revise its  combined license or early site permit application to comply with those  changes no later than December 31, 2013.     In the proposed rule, the NRC also requested input on the  implementation schedule for each element of the proposed rule for  current licensees. The NRC received a number of comments on the  appropriateness of the proposed implementation schedule, including  whether arbitrary implementation deadlines were needed or if schedules  should be site-specific to allow licensees to budget resources and  properly coordinate EP program changes with OROs. The NRC believes that  a single fixed implementation schedule is warranted to avoid wide  variations among licensees in implementing the new requirements, to  ensure that new requirements with long lead times, such as those  involving biennial exercises, are addressed in a timely manner, and to  avoid potential problems for offsite agencies that support multiple  sites.

VI. Guidance

    The NRC revised existing guidance and provided new guidance for the  new requirements in this final rule. This guidance is intended to  provide an acceptable method of how licensees and applicants can meet  the requirements of the final rule. The NRC will publish

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Federal Register notices announcing the availability of the revised and  new guidance documents. The documents will be available at http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122.

VII. Criminal Penalties

    Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),  provides for criminal sanctions for willful violation of, attempted  violation of, or conspiracy to violate, any regulation issued under  Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. For the purposes of Section  223 of the AEA, the Commission is amending 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 and  Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 161b, 161i, and 161o of the AEA.

VIII. Agreement State Compatibility

    Under the Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of  Agreement States Programs, approved by the Commission on June 20, 1997,  and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997),  this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility is not  required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program elements in  this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation  reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of this chapter.  Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements reserved to  the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain requirements by  a mechanism that is consistent with the particular State's  administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do not  confer regulatory authority on the State.

IX. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to  interested persons through one or more of the methods provided in the  ADDRESSES section of this document, as indicated.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                     NRC library                            Document                                   PDR              Web            (ADAMS) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards and                      X   ...............     ML020510635  Security Compensatory Measures,'' issued February 25, 2002... SRM-M041214B- ``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program                   X   ...............     ML043550354  Initiatives, 1 p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004,  Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North,  Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated  December 20, 2004............................................ Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), ``Emergency Preparedness and                    X   ...............     ML051990027  Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated July 18,  2005......................................................... SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency                           X   ...............     ML061910707  Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20,  2006......................................................... SRM to SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of Emergency                    X   ...............     ML070080411  Preparedness Regulations and Guidance'' dated January 8, 2007 Memorandum to the Commission, ``Rulemaking Plan for                          X   ...............     ML070440148  Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations and  Guidance,'' dated April 17, 2007............................. SRM-M060502, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of                     X   ...............     ML061810014  Emergency Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1  p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, Commissioners' Conference Room,  One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to public  attendance)'' dated June 29, 2006............................ ``Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Emergency                      X                X      ML080940227  Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,'' dated April  3, 2008...................................................... Draft Preliminary Rule Language, Emergency Preparedness                      X                X      ML080370069  Rulemaking, February, 2008................................... ``Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Comments on                     X                X      ML082180005  Emergency Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,''  dated August 6, 2008......................................... Order EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' issued                      X   ...............     ML030060360  January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13, 2003)............... Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and                           X   ...............     ML030910625  Qualification Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April  29, 2003 (68 FR 24514; May 7, 2003).......................... Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' issued               X   ...............     ML030740002  April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003).................... Federal Register Notice--Final Rule to Amend 10 CFR 73.1:                    X   ...............     ML070520692  Design Basis Threat (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007)............ Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at Nuclear                   X   ...............    Non-Publicly  Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991......................                                         Available IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise On-                      X   ...............     ML031070314  Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993.............................. IN 95-48, ``Results of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October                 X   ...............     ML031060170  10, 1995..................................................... NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for Preparation and                        X   ...............     ML040420012  Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and  Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated  November 1980................................................ NUREG-0849, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review and                        X   ...............     ML062190191  Evaluation of Emergency Plans for Research and Test  Reactors,'' dated October 1983............................... NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, ``Methodology for Development of                X   ...............     ML041120174  Emergency Action Levels,'' dated January 1992................ NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for Development of                      X   ...............     ML073330643  Emergency Action Level,'' dated September 2007............... Regulatory Guide 2.6, ``Emergency Planning for Research and                  X   ...............     ML003740234  Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983............................ Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear                   X   ...............     ML072670421  Energy Institute Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency  Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,' '' dated July 19,  2006......................................................... Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness                   X   ...............    Non-Publicly  Issues: Post-9/11,'' dated October 18, 2004..................                                         Available

[[Page 72593]]


NEI 06-04, ``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency                     X   ...............     ML073100460  Response Drill,'' Rev. 1, dated October 30, 2007............. RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear Energy                   X   ...............     ML080110116  Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a Hostile  Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19,  2008......................................................... IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to Licensees' Ability to Provide                    X   ...............     ML022380474  Prompt Public Notification and Information During an  Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 2002........ IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification                     X   ...............     ML050680335  System Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005... IN 2006-28, ``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren                   X   ...............     ML062790341  System Signal,'' dated December 22, 2006..................... IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When                  X   ...............     ML031060187  Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' dated April 2,  1996......................................................... Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ``Station Blackout,'' issued                    X   ...............     ML003740034  August 1988.................................................. FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and            ...............    www.fema.gov   ..............  Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated  November 1985................................................ IN 85-80, ``Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class,                        X   ...............     ML031180307  Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency  Notifications,'' dated October 15, 1985...................... Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)-2, ``Emergency                       X   ...............     ML023040462  Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification  of Emergency Conditions,'' dated August 1, 1995.............. NUREG/CR-6953 Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG-0654 Supplement 3,                   X   ...............     ML080360602  Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe  Accidents,'' dated December 2007............................. NUREG/CR-6863, ``Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for                X   ...............     ML050250240  Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated January 2005................... NUREG/CR-6864, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors                      X   ...............     ML050250245  Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' dated January 2005........ NUREG/CR-7002, ``Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time                 X   ...............     ML113010515  Estimate Studies,'' dated November 2011...................... EPPOS-4, ``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure                         X   ...............     ML023040483  Changes,'' dated November 19, 1998........................... Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) 4,                     X   ...............     ML050800537  ``Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,'' dated  November 19, 1998............................................ RIS 2005-02, ``Clarifying the Process for Making Emergency                   X   ...............     ML042580404  Plan Changes,'' dated February 14, 2005...................... ``Discussion of NREP `Parking Lot' Items,'' dated August 11,                 X   ...............     ML052000263  2005......................................................... Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and September 1, 2005 Portion                X   ...............     ML052620366  of the Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting................. ``Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31               X   ...............     ML060450376  and October 31, 2005),'' dated February 28, 2006............. ``Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments (Received                   X   ...............     ML060860401  Between August 31 and October 31, 2005),'' dated March 31,  2006......................................................... Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow Up Discussions of       ...............  ...............     ML061590186  Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness  Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,  held May 19, 2006............................................ NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for Emergency Response                     X   ...............     ML051390358  Facilities,'' dated February 1981............................ SRM to SECY-04-0236, ``Southern Nuclear Operating Company's                  X   ...............     ML050550131  Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating Facility  at Its Corporate Headquarters,'' dated February 23, 2005..... NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,''               X   ...............     ML051390367  Supplement 1, ``Requirements for Emergency Response  Capabilities,'' dated January 1983........................... NEI 99-02, ``Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator                     X   ...............     ML092931123  Guideline,'' Rev. 6, dated October 2009...................... Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute on EP draft                   X                X      ML081690809  preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for comments:  NEI1-X)...................................................... Comments submitted by Union of Concerned Scientists on EP                    X                X      ML081840067  draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for  comments: NGO1-X)............................................ Comments submitted by PA Bureau of Radiation Protection on EP                X                X      ML081690778  draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for  comments: SPA1-X)............................................ EP final rule Regulatory Analysis and Backfit Analysis........               X                X      ML112971541 EP final rule Environmental Assessment........................               X                X      ML102150163 EP Paperwork Burden Analysis..................................               X                X      ML112971537 NRC comment responses for EP draft preliminary rule language..               X                X      ML091180198 Summary and Analysis of Public Comments on Proposed Rule                     X                X      ML112971546  Language..................................................... Summary of September 17, 2009, Meeting to Discuss the Proposed               X                X      ML092881256  Rule on Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations  and Related Guidance Documents (October 16, 2009)............ SRM to SECY-07-0009, ``Possible Reactivation of Construction                 X                X      ML072060688  and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit  2,'' dated July 25, 2007..................................... SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to                     X                X      ML082890481  Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),'' dated  January 9, 2009.............................................. SRM to SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements                 X   ...............     ML091060206  to Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR part 50),''  dated April 16, 2009.........................................

[[Page 72594]]


SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed                  X   ...............     ML100130067  Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,  9:30 a.m., Tuesday, December 8, 2009, Commissioners'  Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland  (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January 13, 2010........ Information from November 15, 2010 Public Meeting to Discuss                 X                X      ML102770561  the Proposed Implementation Dates of the Emergency  Preparedness Final Rule...................................... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,  Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical  standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus  standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with  applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any  voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed  Government-unique standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary  consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified.

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental  Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in  Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal  action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment  and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.     The NRC requested public comments on any environmental justice  considerations that may be related to this rule and no comments were  received. The NRC also requested the views of the States on the  environmental assessment for this rule and no comments were received.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule contains new or amended information collection  requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995  (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Approval Number 3150-0011.     The burden to the public for these information collections is  estimated to average 123 hours per response, including the time for  reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and  maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the  information collection. Send comments on any aspect of these  information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden,  to the Information Services Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail  to INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@NRC.GOV; and to the Desk Officer, Office of  Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office of  Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to  respond to, a request for information or an information collection  requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid  OMB control number.

XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability

    The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this  regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the  alternatives considered by the Commission. Availability of the  regulatory analysis is indicated in Section IX of this document.

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the  Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant  economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule  affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The  companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the  definition of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory  Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR  2.810).

XV. Backfit Analysis

    As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a  backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission finds that the  backfits contained in the final rule, when considered in the aggregate,  will constitute a substantial increase in EP and are justified in view  of this increased protection of the public health and safety.  Availability of the backfit analysis is indicated in Section IX of this  document.

XVI. Congressional Review Act

    Under the Congressional Review Act of 1996, the NRC has determined  that this action is not a major rule and has verified this  determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of  the OMB.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire  protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and  reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and  recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 52

    Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,  Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees,  Inspection, Limited work authorization, Nuclear power plants and  reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting  criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,  Standard design, Standard design certification.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of  the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization  Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting  the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50 and part 52.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION  FACILITIES

0 1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189,  68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec.  234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,  2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202,  206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842,  5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy  Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 194 (2005).  Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.  2951 (42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101,  185, 68 Stat. 955, as

[[Page 72595]]

amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat.  853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).

    Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued under sec.  108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).     Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.  185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and  Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853  (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec.  204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and  50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.  2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42  U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68  Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under  sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).


0 2. In Sec.  50.47, revise paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10), and (d)(1) to  read as follows:


Sec.  50.47  Emergency plans.

* * * * *     (b) * * *     (3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance  resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local  staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made,  and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have  been identified. * * * * *     (10) A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume  exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In  developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to  evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic  use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates  have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update  the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the  choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with  Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions  for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have  been developed. * * * * *     (d) * * *     (1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite  assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State  and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have  been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned  onsite response have been identified. * * * * *

0 3. In Sec.  50.54: 0 a. Revise paragraph (q), the introductory text of paragraph (gg)(1),  and paragraphs (gg)(1)(i) and (gg)(2); and 0 b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), (s)(1), (s)(2)(i), and (u).     The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  50.54  Conditions of licenses.

* * * * *     (q) Emergency plans.     (1) Definitions for the purpose of this section:     (i) Change means an action that results in modification or addition  to, or removal from, the licensee's emergency plan. All such changes  are subject to the provisions of this section except where the  applicable regulations establish specific criteria for accomplishing a  particular change.     (ii) Emergency plan means the document(s), prepared and maintained  by the licensee, that identify and describe the licensee's methods for  maintaining emergency preparedness and responding to emergencies. An  emergency plan includes the plan as originally approved by the NRC and  all subsequent changes made by the licensee with, and without, prior  NRC review and approval under paragraph (q) of this section.     (iii) Emergency planning function means a capability or resource  necessary to prepare for and respond to a radiological emergency, as  set forth in the elements of section IV. of appendix E to this part  and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of  Sec.  50.47(b).     (iv) Reduction in effectiveness means a change in an emergency plan  that results in reducing the licensee's capability to perform an  emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency.     (2) A holder of a license under this part, or a combined license  under part 52 of this chapter after the Commission makes the finding  under Sec.  52.103(g) of this chapter, shall follow and maintain the  effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in  appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the  planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).     (3) The licensee may make changes to its emergency plan without NRC  approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis  demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the  plan and the plan, as changed, continues to meet the requirements in  appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the  planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).     (4) The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the  effectiveness of the plan as defined in paragraph (q)(1)(iv) of this  section may not be implemented without prior approval by the NRC. A  licensee desiring to make such a change after February 21, 2012 shall  submit an application for an amendment to its license. In addition to  the filing requirements of Sec. Sec.  50.90 and 50.91, the request must  include all emergency plan pages affected by that change and must be  accompanied by a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason  for the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's  emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in  appendix E to this part and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, the  planning standards of Sec.  50.47(b).     (5) The licensee shall retain a record of each change to the  emergency plan made without prior NRC approval for a period of three  years from the date of the change and shall submit, as specified in  Sec.  50.4, a report of each such change made after February 21, 2012,  including a summary of its analysis, within 30 days after the change is  put in effect.     (6) The nuclear power reactor licensee shall retain the emergency  plan and each change for which prior NRC approval was obtained pursuant  to paragraph (q)(4) of this section as a record until the Commission  terminates the license for the nuclear power reactor.     (r) [Reserved]     (s)(1) [Reserved]     (2)(i) [Reserved] * * * * *     (u) [Reserved] * * * * *     (gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 52.103, if, following the conduct of  the exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a of appendix E to part 50 of  this chapter, FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of  offsite emergency preparedness, the holder of a combined license under  10 CFR part 52 may operate at up to 5 percent of rated thermal power  only if the Commission finds that the state of onsite emergency  preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective  measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological  emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the  applicant's onsite emergency plans against the pertinent standards in  Sec.  50.47 and appendix E to this part. Review of the applicant's  emergency plans will include the following standards with offsite  aspects:     (i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite  assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and  local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been  made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the

[[Page 72596]]

planned onsite response have been identified. * * * * *     (2) The condition in this paragraph, regarding operation at up to 5  percent power, ceases to apply 30 days after FEMA informs the NRC that  the offsite deficiencies have been corrected, unless the NRC notifies  the combined license holder before the expiration of the 30-day period  that the Commission finds under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this  section that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide  reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be  taken in the event of a radiological emergency. * * * * *

0 4. In Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50: 0 a. Revise Section I; 0 b. In Section II, revise paragraph H; and 0 c. Revise Section IV.     The revisions read as follows:

Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for  Production and Utilization Facilities

* * * * *

I. Introduction

    1. Each applicant for a construction permit is required by Sec.   50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a  discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each  applicant for an operating license is required by Sec.  50.34(b) to  include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with  emergencies. Each applicant for a combined license under subpart C  of part 52 of this chapter is required by Sec.  52.79 of this  chapter to include in the application plans for coping with  emergencies. Each applicant for an early site permit under subpart A  of part 52 of this chapter may submit plans for coping with  emergencies under Sec.  52.17 of this chapter.     2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency  plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency  preparedness. These plans shall be described generally in the  preliminary safety analysis report for a construction permit and  submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an  operating license. These plans, or major features thereof, may be  submitted as part of the site safety analysis report for an early  site permit.     3. The potential radiological hazards to the public associated  with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities  licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve considerations  different than those associated with nuclear power reactors.  Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones\1\ (EPZs) for  facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which  compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II,  III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined on a  case-by-case basis.\2\ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ EPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA  520/1-78-016, ``Planning Basis for the Development of State and  Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of  Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' December 1978. The size of the  EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to  local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected  by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics,  access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs  also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled  nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level  less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ  for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than  250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in  radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about  50 miles (80 km) in radius.     \2\ Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the  acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in the case of an  operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power  operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no NRC or FEMA review,  findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite  emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and the capability to  implement State and local offsite emergency plans, as defined in  this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of such a license.     5. Each applicant for a combined license or early site permit  under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before  December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with any change to emergency  preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 23,  2011. If that applicant chooses to defer compliance, it shall  subsequently request to amend the combined license or early site  permit to comply with those changes no later than December 31, 2013.  An applicant that does not receive a combined license or early site  permit before December 31, 2013, shall revise its combined license  or early site permit application to comply with those changes no  later than December 31, 2013. Notwithstanding any Commission finding  under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined license holder's  facility, the combined license holder may not operate the facility  until the NRC has approved the license amendment demonstrating  compliance with the final rule.     6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit  2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 50 of  this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued  November 23, 2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power reactor  licensees.

II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

* * * * *     H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include  facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of  seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of  emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including  capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological  information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within  the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the  onsite technical support center and the emergency operations  facility in assessing information, recommending protective action,  and disseminating information to the public. * * * * *

IV. Content of Emergency Plans

    1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not  necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate  compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for  coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation  of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency  facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency  preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions during hostile  action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an  applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this  part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined  license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to  demonstrate compliance with the standards described in Sec.   50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards.     2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also  provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors  and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient  and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau  data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the  NRC.     3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use NRC approved  evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the  formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide  the ETEs and ETE updates to State and local governmental authorities  for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.     4. Within 365 days of the later of the date of the availability  of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau  or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop  an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under Sec.   50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall submit this ETE analysis to  the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action  recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental  authorities for use in developing offsite protective action  strategies.     5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power  reactor licensees shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population  changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the  previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual  resident population estimate and State/local government population  data, if available. These licensees shall maintain these estimates  so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period  between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the  NRC with any updated ETE analysis.     6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent  resident population increases such that it causes the

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longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all  affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10- mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less,  from the nuclear power reactor licensee's currently NRC approved or  updated ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect  the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit  the updated ETE analysis to the NRC under Sec.  50.4 no later than  365 days after the licensee's determination that the criteria for  updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it  to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State  and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite  protective action strategies.     7. After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 of  this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at  least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at  least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall  estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most  recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and  State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ  permanent resident population increases such that it causes the  longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all  affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10- mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is  less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall  update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population  increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the  NRC for review under Sec.  50.4 of this chapter no later than 365  days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.

A. Organization

    The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall  be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities,  and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency  organization and the means for notification of such individuals in  the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be  included:     1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.     2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization  (ERO) with a detailed discussion of:     a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the  individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;     b. Plant staff emergency assignments;     c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite  emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of  information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating  and implementing offsite emergency measures.     3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of  the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant  site to augment the onsite emergency organization.     4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of  persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for  making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these  projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and  local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.     5. Identification, by position and function to be performed, of  other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for  coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with  special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees  of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for  emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of  these persons shall be described.     6. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in  support of the licensee's emergency organization.     7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a description of the  assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal  agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies,  including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix,  ``hostile action'' is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear  power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force  to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee  to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using  guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to  deliver destructive force.     8. Identification of the State and/or local officials  responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate  protective actions, including evacuations when necessary.     9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a  detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned  emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned  responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their  assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.

B. Assessment Actions

    1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and  for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive  materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that  are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification  and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and  other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to  be used for determining when and what type of protective measures  should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect  health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in- plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and  offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor  licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may  adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency  action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or  licensee and state and local governmental authorities, and approved  by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed  with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual  basis.     2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action  level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its  license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change.  Licensees shall follow the change process in Sec.  50.54(q) for all  other emergency action level changes.

C. Activation of Emergency Organization

    1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the  alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total  emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps  to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each  class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels  (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring  information but also on readings from a number of sensors that  indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment  and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for  notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence,  but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be  noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall  include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site  area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further  discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.     2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall  establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and  declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the  availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency  action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the  emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of  the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not  construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore  plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an  emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not  construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response  actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public  health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not  deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement  measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

D. Notification Procedures

    1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State,  and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these  officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and  for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they  become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include  identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of  the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.     2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the  public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency  planning information, such as the methods and times required for  public notification and the protective actions planned if an  accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of  radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be  used for dissemination of information during an

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emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate  to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ  appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.     3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible  State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after  declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the  appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a  public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed  by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial  operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first  reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall  demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been  established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the  public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective  of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have  the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and  initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure  pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and  notification capability will range from immediate alerting and  notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State  and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring  urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial  time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make  a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and  notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall  additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup  method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in  the event the primary method of alerting and notification is  unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions  of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method  shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the  plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15-minute  design objective for the primary prompt public alert and  notification system. When there is a decision to activate the alert  and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities  will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification  system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The  responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification  system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.     4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power reactor site's alert and  notification design report, including the backup alert and  notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, then the backup  alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3  must be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the alert and  notification design report does not include a backup alert and  notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate backup  alert and notification capability, then a revision of the alert and  notification design report must be submitted to FEMA for review by  June 24, 2013, and the FEMA-approved backup alert and notification  means must be implemented within 365 days after FEMA approval.  However, the total time period to implement a FEMA-approved backup  alert and notification means must not exceed June 22, 2015.

E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment

    Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency  facilities and equipment, including:     1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;     2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for  continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive  materials to the environment;     3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of  onsite individuals;     4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate  emergency first aid treatment;     5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to  handle radiological emergencies onsite;     6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured  individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment  facilities outside the site boundary;     7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support  of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside  the site boundary;     8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an  emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be  given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;     (ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite  operational support center;     b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations  facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a  facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power  reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles  from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located  between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s).  An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear  power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency  operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor  site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an  application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency  operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power  reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite  responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and  offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response  personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site.  Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a  nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the  emergency operations facility must include the following:     (1) Space for members of an NRC site team and Federal, State,  and local responders;     (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency  response personnel;     (3) Communication with other licensee and offsite emergency  response facilities;     (4) Access to plant data and radiological information; and     (5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies;     c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's  emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this  section, a facility having the following capabilities:     (1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and  radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor  site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility  serves;     (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and  provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to  licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a  nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site  that the facility serves; and     (3) The capability to support response to events occurring  simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the  emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and     d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an alternative facility  (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under  threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging  area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively  having the following characteristics: the capability for  communication with the emergency operations facility, control room,  and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications;  and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including  damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite  emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile  action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented  no later than December 23, 2014, with the exception of the  capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at  the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for  communications with the emergency operations facility, control room,  and plant security, which must be implemented no later than June 20,  2012.     e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of  paragraph 8.b of this section for an existing emergency operations  facility approved as of December 23, 2011;     9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system;  each system shall have a backup power source. All communication  plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and  alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication  links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where  consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these  arrangements will include:     a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local  governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such  communications shall be tested monthly.     b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response  organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.     c. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor  control room, the

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onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations  facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and  local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams.  Such communications systems shall be tested annually.     d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC  Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations  Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite  technical support center, and the emergency operations facility.  Such communications shall be tested monthly.

F. Training

    1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and  exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that  employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency  response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and  drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event  of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a  description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining  programs to be provided to each of the following categories of  emergency personnel:     i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency  organization;     ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including  control room shift personnel;     iii Radiological monitoring teams;     iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades);     v. Repair and damage control teams;     vi. First aid and rescue teams;     vii. Medical support personnel;     viii. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;     ix. Security personnel.     In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall  be made available to local services personnel; e.g., local emergency  services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news  media persons.     2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of  emergency preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test  the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and  methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test  the public alert and notification system, and ensure that emergency  organization personnel are familiar with their duties.\3\ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable  for any exercise. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. A full participation \4\ exercise which tests as much of the  licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably  achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted  for each site at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear power  reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec.  50.4  at least 60 days before use in a full participation exercise  required by this paragraph 2.a. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency  preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate  offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel  physically and actively take part in testing their integrated  capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a  commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing  major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans  and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other  resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond  to the accident scenario. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) For an operating license issued under this part, this  exercise must be conducted within two years before the issuance of  the first operating license for full power (one authorizing  operation above 5 percent of rated power) of the first reactor and  shall include participation by each State and local government  within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state within the  ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise  is conducted more than 1 year prior to issuance of an operating  licensee for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's  onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before  issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise need  not have State or local government participation.     (ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this  chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the  scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full  participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the  scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests  the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one  year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This  exercise need not have State or local government participation. If  FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite  emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation  exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency  preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate  protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a  radiological emergency, the provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply.     (iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of this  chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the  site, an exercise, either full or partial participation,\5\ shall be  conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This  exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of  Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one  or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness  as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or if the  Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not  provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can  and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the  provisions of Sec.  50.54(gg) apply. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Partial participation when used in conjunction with  emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means  appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the  exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions; i.e.,  (a) protective action decision making related to emergency action  levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and  local authorities and the licensee. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a subsequent  exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power  reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under Sec.  50.4  at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this  paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full  participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this  section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to  ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained  during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills,  including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the  principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency  response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency  response include activities such as management and coordination of  emergency response, accident assessment, event classification,  notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and  offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action  recommendation development, protective action decision making, plant  system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these  drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response  facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support  Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would not  be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider  accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be  permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would  have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than  have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite  exercise training objectives.     c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially  with full participation by each offsite authority having a role  under the radiological response plan. Where the offsite authority  has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one  site, it shall fully participate in one exercise every two years and  shall, at least, partially participate in other offsite plan  exercises in this period. If two different licensees each have  licensed facilities located either on the same site or on adjacent,  contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located  licensees,\6\ then each licensee shall: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose  licensed facilities are located either on the same site or on  adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following  emergency planning and siting elements:     a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones;     b. Offsite governmental authorities;     c. Offsite emergency response organizations;     d. Public notification system; and/or     e. Emergency facilities. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan;     (2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full or  partial participation exercise;     (3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions  in the years between its participation in the offsite full or  partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and  maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities  and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in  emergency preparedness

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activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period  between exercises;     (4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite emergency  plan in each exercise cycle; and     (5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial  participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise  cycles.     d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor  emergency preparedness should fully participate in the ingestion  pathway portion of exercises at least once every exercise cycle. In  States with more than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure  pathway EPZ, the State should rotate this participation from site to  site. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor  emergency preparedness should fully participate in a hostile action  exercise at least once every cycle and should fully participate in  one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more  than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should  rotate this participation from site to site.     e. Licensees shall enable any State or local government located  within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the  licensee's drills when requested by such State or local government.     f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is  not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that  NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find reasonable assurance  that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event  of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency  Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to  emergency response. The extent of State and local participation in  remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate  corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the  plan not properly tested in the previous exercises.     g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide performance  opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must  provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient  areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are  identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be  corrected.     h. The participation of State and local governments in an  emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant  has identified those governments as refusing to participate further  in emergency planning activities, pursuant to Sec.  50.47(c)(1). In  such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee  and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the  emergency planning process.     i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide  reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses will not result  from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios for nuclear  power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological  releases and events, including hostile action. Exercise and drill  scenarios as appropriate must emphasize coordination among onsite  and offsite response organizations.     j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by  nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the  ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to  implement the principal functional areas of emergency response  identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must  provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills  specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC,  EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each eight  calendar year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall  vary the content of scenarios during exercises conducted under  paragraph 2 of this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO  to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to  the following scenario elements: hostile action directed at the  plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal  radiological release that does not require public protective  actions, an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site  Area Emergency or General Emergency, implementation of strategies,  procedures, and guidance developed under Sec.  50.54(hh)(2), and  integration of offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee  shall maintain a record of exercises conducted during each eight  year exercise cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to  comply with the requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall  conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later  than December 31, 2015. The first eight-year exercise cycle for a  site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile  action exercise is conducted. For a site licensed under Part 52, the  first eight-year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the  initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a.

G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

    Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its  implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are  maintained up to date shall be described.

H. Recovery

    Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident,  reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could  be resumed shall be described.

I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action

    By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, a range  of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile  action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the  licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions  of the licensee's emergency plan.

PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER  PLANTS

0 5. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat.  936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as  amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs.  201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C.  5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note);  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005),  secs. 147 and 149 of the Atomic Energy Act.


0 6. In Sec.  52.79, paragraph (a)(17) is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  52.79  Contents of applications; technical information in final  safety analysis report.

    (a) * * *     (17) The information with respect to compliance with technically  relevant positions of the Three Mile Island requirements in Sec.   50.34(f) of this chapter, with the exception of Sec.  50.34(f)(1)(xii),  (f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), and (f)(3)(v); * * * * *

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of November 2011.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission. [FR Doc. 2011-29735 Filed 11-22-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P






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